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2 
The Most Dangerous Spot on Earth: First Origins and the Early Cold War 
 
 For the better part of the Twentieth century, the Middle East, and more 
specifically the Persian Gulf, have been areas of key importance to the United States. As 
the United States became increasingly reliant on Middle Eastern oil, it became more 
attuned to events in the Persian Gulf, seeking to create a regional order conducive to US 
interests. First and foremost among those interests were cheap and easily accessible oil, 
and a security situation which would not impede the flow of oil to the West. In order to 
create this situation, the US has sought to exert its influence on all of the states of the 
Persian Gulf. Among those states was Iraq. With proven oil reserves estimated by OPEC 
to be the fourth largest in the world, Iraq has always been valued by the US as a 
geopolitical prize.1 While certainly not the sole interest in Iraq, oil proved to be the most 
important and enduring interest. In the course of pursuing its national interests, the US 
thrust itself into a deeply divided country with a troubled and violent history. In doing so, 
the US engaged in a series of ill-advised and short-sighted policy decisions, which in turn 
have provoked conflict, led to the deaths of millions of Iraqis, the destruction of a society, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the destabilization of the Middle East. 
Underlying this is a paradoxical phenomenon: the more the US attempted to bring Iraq 
under US sway and control, the more out of control the situation became. The more 
recent suffering of Iraq, from the US invasion to the scourge of ISIL, is very much a 
product of almost a century of US-Iraq relations. Then, as now, the relationship was 
based first and foremost around oil.  
                                                
1 “OPEC share of world crude oil reserves, 2017”, OPEC, accessed 21 February 2019, 
https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm 
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 In 1914, the Ottoman Grand Vizier oversaw the formation of an international oil 
consortium. Together with French, German, and Dutch interests, the Turkish Petroleum 
Company (TPC) was formed, granting its members the right to exploit oil within the 
Ottoman Middle East, including the three provinces which would become Iraq.2 After the 
end of World War I, the French acquired the German shares. Claiming the mandate 
powers awarded by the League of Nations gave them exclusive rights over natural 
resources within mandate territory, the British and French sought to exclude any other 
state, including the US, from breaking up their duopoly. The US complained bitterly 
about the Anglo-French recalcitrance. It was American intervention in the trenches of 
World War I which turned the tide of the war in favour of the Allies, and it was due 
largely to US initiative that the League of Nations was established, they argued. Yet 
Britain and France were unswayed. “The Anglo-French combination is determined to 
keep American companies out of the new oil fields of the Near East,” complained Hugh 
Wallace, US Ambassador to France.3 Yet the US remained steadfast, demanding a quid 
pro quo for its efforts in World War I, driven by a growing energy demand. 
 In 1921, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover organized America’s seven-
largest oil companies into a formidable consortium to take on the British and French. Its 
members included SOCONY (later Mobil), New Jersey (later Esso/Exxon), Texaco, 
Sinclair, Mexican, Atlantic, and Gulf. Britain and France gave in. With the Ottomans 
gone, the US was invited into the new consortium, the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). In 
order to contain US ambitions, Britain and France made US membership conditional to a 
clause subjecting oil exploitation strictly within the IPC framework. In return, the US was 
                                                
2 Geoff Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to Post-Saddam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 268 
3 Michael Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present (New 
York: W.W Norton & Company, 2007), 410 
4 
awarded a 23.75 percent share in the consortium.4 For the US, it was a resounding 
diplomatic victory. However, they had yet to grasp the jackpot they had stumbled upon. 
Uncertain of the true volume of oil in IPC territory, the investment was very much a 
gamble. Amid domestic fears of an impending oil shortage, shared among politicians, 
scientists, and engineers, the investment was regarded as prudent. In 1919, the director of 
the Bureau of Mines warned that “within the next two to five years the oil in this country 
will reach their maximum production, and from that time on we will face an ever-
increasing decline,” while United States Geological Survey director George Otis Smith 
warned of a “gasoline famine.”5 Ultimately the gamble paid off, with the discovery of oil 
in Kirkuk in 1927.6 With oil yet to be discovered in Saudi Arabia, and a British monopoly 
on Iranian oil, at that time Iraq represented America’s greatest hope of extracting oil from 
the Middle East. Thus marked the beginning of the long and troubled relationship 
between Iraq and the US.  
 In order to do business in the IPC, the US found itself needing to be on friendly 
terms with the Iraqi monarchy and Britain. As such, this ensured that Britain would take 
the lead role in maintaining an order conducive to western interests in Iraq, especially 
through military force, while the US could reap the benefits, with little to no cost to the 
US. The modern state of Iraq was, after all, an artificial creation of Britain, as was the 
Hashimi monarchy installed by Britain following the suppression of the 1920 rebellion. It 
would not be until certain developments from 1945 onwards, with the strategic 
partnership forged between the US and Saudi Arabia, the deepening energy dependence 
                                                
4 Ibid, 411 
5 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Free Press, 
2009), 178 
6 Gary Vogler, Iraq and the Politics of Oil: An Insider’s Perspective (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2017), 36 
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on the Middle East, supporting the creation of the state of Israel, and the start of the Cold 
War that the US took on greater direct and indirect role in influencing Iraqi affairs.  
 While many policymakers would not have known it, the US would later become 
deeply entrenched in Iraq. In seeking to exert its power over Iraq, it would have 
behooved the US to study the British experience. The most important lesson to be derived 
from the British experience in Iraq is that while certain measures would succeed in 
bringing short-term stability, in the longer term it would only breed resentment and lead 
to a larger conflagration.  
In 1917, as part of an effort to deprive the Ottoman empire of its Arab territories 
during World War I, the British invaded the provinces of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. 
Out of these three provinces, Britain hobbled together the modern state of Iraq. The 
British attempted to rule over the country directly, appointing Percy Cox as High 
Commissioner of Iraq. By May 1920, Iraqi resentment boiled over, following efforts by 
the British authorities to levy taxes and arrest some recalcitrant tribal chiefs.7 The scale 
and severity of the rebellion was made evident by how widespread it was, cutting across 
deep sectarian and ethnic divisions. Prime Minister Winston Churchill remarked:  
It is an extraordinary thing that the British civil administration should have 
succeeded in such a short time in alienating the whole country to such an extent 
that the Arabs have laid aside the blood feuds that they have nursed for centuries 
and that the Suni [sic] and Shiah [sic] tribes are working together. We have even 
been advised locally that the best way to get our supplies up the river would be to 
fly the Turkish flag, which would be respected by the tribesmen.8  
 
The British used the latest technology, including air power, to crush the rebellion. Royal 
Air Force Wing Commander Arthur “Bomber” Harris remarked: “The Arab and Kurd 
                                                
7 Christopher Catherwood, Churchill’s Folly: How Winston Churchill Created Modern Iraq (New 
York: Barnes and Noble, 2004), 81 
8 Ibid, 88 
6 
now know what real bombing means in casualties and damage. Within forty-five minutes 
a full-sized village can practically be wiped out and a third of its inhabitants killed or 
injured.”9  
 With its resources stretched thin after World War I, the British government 
understood that continued occupation and direct rule over Iraq would provoke further 
revolts, which the British treasury could ill afford.10 Unwilling to leave completely, 
Britain opted to rule through proxy. During the 1921 Cairo conference, British leaders 
and leading orientalists elected to establish a monarchy in Iraq, led by Faisal al-Hashimi. 
Faisal was an outsider with no support base in Iraq, who would be wholly reliant on a 
foreign power to maintain his rule. After British support for his leadership of the Hijazi 
revolt, then allowing the French to invade Syria and topple his Damascus-based Arab 
kingdom, Faisal had nowhere to go. As such, the British saw in Faisal a pliant proxy, one 
which Churchill described as having the additional benefit of providing “[the] best 
chance of saving our money.”11 The British then foisted upon its pliant proxy the 1922 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The Treaty required the “employment of British officials in the Iraq 
government,” with whom the Iraqi King would need to consult with on a regular basis. In 
matters of economics, foreign policy, and defense, the King was required to abide by “the 
advice of His Britannic Majesty tendered through the High Commissioner …” With 
regards to military affairs, Iraq was required to only purchase British arms, while 
                                                
9 Simons, 214 
10 Marion Farouk Sluglett & Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (New 
York: I.B. Taurus, 2003) 13 
11 Catherwood, 133 
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granting basing rights and the right to return for British forces.12 The terms of the Treaty 
effectively rendered Iraqi independence to be an illusion.  
 Equally illusory was the notion that this British creation would guarantee internal 
stability. As far as the Iraqi people were concerned, the system in place led to abject 
poverty and repeated humiliations, such that any successful efforts to create short-term 
stability would only succeed in provoking a much greater anti-colonial conflagration in 
the future. By chance, that large conflagration took place at a time when the US began to 
overshadow Britain as the dominant power in the Middle East, in the early days of the 
Cold War. As such, it is worth recalling the struggles of the Iraqi people in an anti-
colonial context. Most of these struggles prior to the Cold War were overlooked by US 
policymakers as irrelevant backwater events. With the emergence of the Cold War, these 
struggles were viewed strictly through the lens of a monolithic communist conspiracy 
fomenting discord in the third world, to the detriment of the West. With this fundamental 
misunderstanding of Iraqi events, the US began its long and troubled blind stumble into 
Iraq. Thus it serves to briefly recall some of the more noteworthy anti-colonial struggles 
in Iraq.  
 While smaller-scale rebellions, protests, and riots were fairly common, there are 
two developments which best highlighted the anti-colonial nature of the struggles of the 
Iraqi people. The first development centered around the most unlikely of figures, King 
Ghazi. The second monarch of Iraq, King Ghazi embraced pan-Arab politics, which 
earned him the rare privilege of being supported by large swaths of the Iraqi people. 
From his radio station, Radio Qasr al-Zuhour, Ghazi called for the annexation of Kuwait 
to Iraq, and greater support to the anti-Zionist struggle in Palestine. In 1936, Ghazi lent 
                                                
12 Treaty of Alliance Between Great Britain and Iraq, 1922 
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his support to a coup led by General Bakr Sidqi which led to the overthrow of Prime 
Minister Yasin al-Hashimi and exiling of a coterie of pro-British politicians.13 To the 
lament of many Iraqis, Ghazi died in a car crash in April 1939. However, many Iraqis 
believe that Ghazi was assassinated. The late Said Aburish pointed out inconsistencies, 
such as the fact that Ghazi’s car was relatively undamaged, the fatal wound was on the 
back of his head, and the refusal of the doctor who oversaw Ghazi’s autopsy to sign the 
death certificate.14 Nonetheless, as the British newspaper The Guardian reported, 
“Ghazi’s death solved a problem for the British who were thinking of removing him.”15  
 The next major effort to unseat the British from Iraq came in 1941 when politician 
Rashid Ali al-Kaylani and a group of four generals known as the Golden Square launched 
a coup against the regent, Prince Abdul Ilah (standing in for the 5-year old King Faisal II) 
and Prime Minister Taha al-Hashimi. Deeply embittered by Ghazi’s death, the coup 
plotters sought to expel the British from Iraq once and for all. For help, they turned to 
Nazi Germany. However, allowing the royal family to escape into exile, failing to unseat 
British forces from their last bastion at Habbaniyah air base, and the failure of the Nazis 
to deliver sufficient aid in time sealed the fate of the coup. In under a month the British 
invaded Iraq and unseated the Golden Square. Those who did not flee Iraq after taking 
part in the coup were handed over to Abdul Ilah to do with as he pleased. The British 
continued to occupy Iraq until 1947.16  
 For US policymakers, these events were perceived as insignificant disturbances in 
a far-off backwater state. With the two interrelated issues of oil and the Cold War, the US 
                                                
13 Simons, 220 
14 Said Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 
2000), 29 
15 Ibid, 30 
16 Simons, 220 
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began to take a greater interest in developments in the Middle East, including in Iraq. 
Western leaders understood that cheap, easily accessible, and plentiful Middle East oil 
was vital to post-World War II reconstruction and the future development of Western 
economies. To this end, the US undertook several efforts, including the oil-for-security 
agreement forged by US President Franklin Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz of Saudi 
Arabia, reinforcing the US position in the IPC, and attempting to break the British 
monopoly on Iranian oil. In light of the Cold War, the US viewed the Middle East as a 
region in which the USSR needed to be denied access, and as another front for 
containment. A series of documents, most notably George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” 
and National Security Council Document 68 (NSC-68), touched on these issues. 
According to NSC-68, the “fundamental design of the Kremlin” was “the complete 
subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of 
society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus 
and structure subservient to and controlled by the Kremlin. To that end Soviet efforts are 
now directed towards the domination of the Eurasian land mass.”17 Thus, by implication, 
the USSR had designs on the Middle East.  
 In order to thwart any Soviet designs in the Middle East, the US sought to 
complete the encirclement of the USSR with military alliances by forming an alliance to 
link the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization(SEATO). Initially, the US supported a British initiative to establish the 
Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), together with France and Turkey. If the 
alliance was to have any teeth, Egypt was deemed to be vitally important. Egypt was 
“obviously the key” to the issues of the Middle East, said President Dwight 
                                                
17 NSC-68, 10 
10 
Eisenhower.18 This owed in part to its size, position, and due to its housing of the Suez 
Canal, but more importantly, due to its new, charismatic leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser. 
Having led an anti-colonial revolution against the British puppet monarchy of King 
Farouk, and adopting a revolutionary, pan-Arab, and anti-imperialist stance, Nasser 
appeared as the least likely candidate to join a western-led military alliance.  
Despite these differences, there were some shared areas of interest which the US 
hoped to exploit. Nasser’s stance on Britain was very clear, yet his stance towards the US 
seemed amenable. On all sides there was a realization that Nasser’s revolution was still 
young, and if it were to survive, he could ill afford to anger Britain, and the West at large. 
He could not outright dismiss the west and, at least in the short term, would have to 
acquiesce to its demands. Yet clearly the US was more willing to deal with Nasser than 
Britain. This was made all the more easy by his very public condemnations of 
communism. During the days of the United Arab Republic, Nasser passed a law which 
outlawed the Communist Party.19 Bearing this in mind, the US saw in Nasser a potential 
ally in keeping the region free of communism. Furthermore, there were a large number of 
Arabists in the State Department and CIA who believed that close relations with the 
Arabs was in the interests of the US, and that Nasser was the key.20 As the US began to 
cultivate close ties to Nasser, the relationship began to hit a few snags. 
The first snag came on 11 May 1953, when US Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles met Nasser in Cairo. High on Dulles’ agenda was persuading Egypt to join 
MEDO. Despite promises of US pressure against Britain, and aid, Nasser was 
                                                
18 Roby Barrett, The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: US Foreign Policy Under 
Eisenhower and Kennedy (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2010), 15 
19 Ibid, 49 
20 Hugh Wilford, America’s Great Game: The CIA’s Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the 
Modern Middle East (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 54 
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uninterested by the proposal. Nasser asked at whom the defense pact was aimed, to which 
Dulles replied, the USSR. While Nasser was anti-communist out of principle, he viewed 
the US claim of a Soviet threat to the Middle East as unrealistic. Nasser asked Dulles: 
How can I go to my people and tell them I am disregarding a killer with a pistol 
sixty miles from me at the Suez Canal [i.e. Israel] to worry about somebody who 
is holding a knife 5,000 miles away? They would tell me first things first.21 
 
Without Egypt, MEDO was deemed unfeasible, and was abandoned. This marked the 
first step in the deterioration of relations between Egypt and the US. While the endpoint 
had yet to be reached, Nasser demonstrated that he was no puppet, that would not submit 
to the dictates of a foreign power on vital interests, and that Arab nationalism could not 
be so easily co-opted to serve US interests. Nonetheless, the US remained determined to 
create a military alliance in the Middle East. Rebuffed by Egypt, the US turned to Iraq.  
 Iraq was viewed as a prime candidate for a military alliance for two reasons. First, 
Iraq’s economic importance increased. In the early-1950s, large new oil discoveries were 
made around Basra. In order to handle the greater output of oil throughout Iraq, the Iraqi 
government turned to US firms such as Bechtel and Brown & Root to construct new 
pipelines.22 Second, much of Iraq’s leadership were sympathetic with US views against 
communism. As historian Adeed Dawisha wrote, “Iraq was the natural choice. With the 
virulent pro-Western and anti-communist [Prime Minister] Nuri at the helm, particularly 
now that he had pliant Parliament and muzzled press, there would be precious few 
obstacles to the passage of such a pact.”23 Iraq’s strongman Prime Minister Nuri al-Said 
found common cause with America’s anti-communist mission. Within his own country, 
                                                
21 Barrett, 16 
22 Vogler, 36, 40 
23 Adeed Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009), 114 
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one of his greatest political rivals was the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), which, as 
historian Rashid Khalidi noted, was “one of the biggest and most active in the Arab 
world.”24 Since its inception in 1934, the ICP had been one of the most active parties in 
Iraq, boycotting British businesses, organizing unions and labor strikes, and pushing for 
improvements in the lives of the Iraqi masses. In January 1948, the ICP organized its 
largest strike to date. Over 3,000 oil workers rallied to demand higher wages at a 
pumping station near Haditha. When the IPC (Iraq Petroleum Company, not to be 
confused with the ICP) refused to meet their demands, the striking workers brought the 
pumping station to a standstill. After two weeks, authorities cut off food and water 
supplies to the station. After three weeks, the strikers decided to take their message to 
Baghdad, in what has been dubbed “The Great March.” When the marchers entered 
Fallujah, the police intervened and arrested them.25 In 1949, after the on-again off-again 
Prime Minister Nuri returned to his post, he unleashed a fierce crackdown against the 
ICP, ordering several of its imprisoned leaders be publicly hanged and left up for 
display.26 While Nuri’s crackdown dealt a severe blow to the ICP, it did not silence it, 
and the party remained active and influential until the ascendancy of the Ba’athists.  
Nuri was seen as an ideal partner for the US, despite his human rights record. 
From the hangings of the Golden Square coup participants to the ICP hangings, it was 
perfectly clear how Nuri exercised power, yet this was not an obstacle for the US. 
Dismissively, Harold Glidden, a State Department analyst wrote in 1958 that “It was 
                                                
24 Rashid Khalidi, Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2009), 151 
25 Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett, 40-41 
26 Ibid 
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generally known for some years that the regime had little popular base: this is, however, 
characteristic of Arab governments.”27 
  Nuri did not have to be persuaded to join a western-backed military alliance. 
Instead, he took the initiative. In January 1955, Iraq and Turkey entered an alliance called 
the Baghdad Pact. Later in the year, Iran, Pakistan, and Britain joined as well. The US 
had not joined, but pledged its support. Each country had its own political reason for 
entering the Pact. Historian Charles Tripp wrote that “The pact thus served a further 
purpose for Nuri al-Said: it ended the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 without committing 
Iraq to enter into another bilateral agreement. Nuri thereby hoped to retain the advantages 
of the alliance with Great Britain (and indeed the Western powers more generally) whilst 
at the same time avoiding the uproar which had followed in the signing of the Portsmouth 
Treaty in 1948.”28 For the US, the Pact connected NATO and SEATO, fully encircling 
the USSR.  
The Baghdad Pact also sought to contain another political force, that of Nasser’s 
brand of Arab nationalism. Ever since Nasser’s rejection of Dulles’ overtures regarding 
MEDO, relations between Egypt and the US began to deteriorate. In 1955, Nasser 
attended the Bandung Conference, one of the first steps in creating the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). The US was opposed to the conference because it undermined the 
narrative of a world split between US-led capitalism and Soviet-led communism. This 
was soon followed by Egyptian diplomatic recognition of the People's’ Republic of 
                                                
27 Charlotte Morehouse, “Memorandum From Howard W. Glidden of the Division of Research and 
Analysis for Near East, South Asia, and Africa to the Director of Intelligence and Research 
(Cumming)”, Department of State Office of the Historian, 16 July 1958. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d120. 
28 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq: New Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
140 
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China. Non-aligned states took a stand, refused to take sides, and reaffirmed their rights 
to exercise relations with whichever state they so desired. Nasser exercised that right 
when, in the same year, Egypt signed an arms deal with Czechoslovakia. The 
unprecedented move broke the British stranglehold over arms sales to the Middle East. 
As a soldier in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Nasser saw firsthand how Arab reliance on 
British arms had led to defeat, following a British Arms embargo.29 While the Czech 
arms deal did not overhaul the Egyptian military into a formidable fighting force, it 
nonetheless set a precedent which undermined western control over the Middle East 
through arms sales. Perhaps most consequential was Nasser’s decision to nationalize the 
Suez Canal. The move was prompted by the need to raise revenues for the construction of 
the Aswan Dam on the Nile River. Initially, the US, Britain, and France offered financial 
and technical assistance, but Egypt refused due to the conditions. Chief among those 
conditions was a demand that Egypt refrain from seeking aid from the USSR and Eastern 
Bloc, a condition Egypt viewed as a violation of its sovereignty. In a three-hour speech to 
the nation, Nasser unleashed Operation Dignity and Glory. With the utterance of the 
codeword “de Lesseps” (as in Ferdinand de Lesseps, the French engineer of the Canal), 
Egyptian security forces mobilized, bringing the Suez Canal firmly under Egyptian 
control.30 Despite the fact that the US came to Egypt’s rescue during the 1956 Suez War, 
pressuring Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw, the honeymoon with Nasser was over. 
Faced with the dual challenges of communism and Arab nationalism, the US 
doubled down in its involvement in the Middle East. In January 1957, President 
Eisenhower announced the Eisenhower Doctrine. Under the Doctrine, any state in the 
                                                
29 Ilan Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (Oxford: One World Publications, 2007), 45 
30 BBC Suez A Very British Crisis, Part I 
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Middle East could request economic aid, military aid, or US military intervention  “to 
protect and secure territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, 
requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by 
international communism.”31 While not explicitly stated, the threat of Arab nationalism 
was included as well, as was demonstrated a year later.  
In 1958, US Middle East policy was put to the test. It appeared that the worst-case 
scenario was coming true. In February, the first step was taken in uniting the Arab world 
into one nation when Egypt and Syria merged into the United Arab Republic (UAR). 
With growing unrest throughout the Middle East, western powers were fearful that more 
states would join the union. In Jordan, where much of the population was supportive of 
Nasser, spurred on in part by the Egyptian radio station Sawt al-Arab (Voice of the 
Arabs), there was hope that Nasser would come to their support. In 1956, under immense 
popular pressure, King Hussein dismissed John Glubb, the British commander of the 
Jordanian military. Later that year, after Jordan’s first parliamentary elections, Suleiman 
Nabulsi was nominated by his party and by King Hussein to form a government. Nabulsi 
went on an independence streak which proved too much for King Hussein and his US and 
British benefactors to stomach. He proved receptive to Nasser, established diplomatic 
relations with the USSR, and allowed the communist party in Jordan to operate in the 
open. The following year, under pressure from his external backers, King Hussein 
dismissed Nabulsi, and dissolved the Parliament.32 With the renewed confidence given to 
them by Nasser, many Jordanians took to the streets, calling for Jordan to unite with the 
                                                
31 “The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957”, Department of State Office of the Historian, 
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32 Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 190 
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UAR. In the same year, Lebanon descended into civil war. In 1957, after buying his way 
into power with CIA money, Camille Chamoun was elected president.33 The following 
year, after trying to force through an illegal amendment to the constitution to extend his 
term, Lebanon spiraled into civil war. Present among the groups fighting Chamoun were 
several pro-Nasser elements, calling on the UAR to provide support. 
In order to contain the growing chaos, and potential for further Nasserist 
revolutions, the US gave greater military support to the Baghdad Pact, and midwived a 
proposed merger between the two Hashimi kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan. The aim of 
supporting the Iraqi-Jordanian Arab Union was to provide a counterbalance to the UAR. 
First, popular support for this initiative was nearly non-existent. Even Iraqi Prime 
Minister Nuri acknowledged that picking up Jordan’s financial burden was unpopular 
from an Iraqi standpoint.34 Nuri also pointed out that without financial assistance from 
the US, and without including Kuwait, the Arab Union was not economically viable.35  
US policymakers grew increasingly hopeless when they realized they had no 
viable alternative to roll back the Arab nationalist tide short of direct military 
intervention. Then the worst case scenario came true. On 14 July 1958, a group of 
military officers led by Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd al-Salaam Arif 
launched a coup against the Iraqi monarchy. Coups were not unheard of in Iraq, much 
less the Middle East, but this one was unprecedented in its extreme violence. Qasim and 
Arif heeded the lesson of of the Golden Square, and eliminated any possible successor. 
As Said Aburish wrote: “To pre-empt any possibility of the monarchy being restored they 
                                                
33 Khalidi, 195 
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made sure of murdering King Faisal II, Ghazi’s son, towards whom the people felt 
affection because of his father. Killing a son to avenge the father’s assassination was an 
ironic act of Shakespearean dimensions.”36 
The military finally got its revenge for Ghazi’s murder, for the Golden Square 
executions, and for its humiliating defeat in Palestine in 1948. What was even more 
frightening was the popular outpouring in the Iraqi streets. After decades of subjugation, 
humiliation, and abject poverty, the reaction of the Iraqi people was unrestrained. The 
Iraqi people were very supportive of the coup, and were eager to take matters into their 
own hands as well. After his execution by the military, the body of the hated regent 
Prince Abdul Ilah was claimed by a mob, dragged through the streets, dismembered, and 
hung up in front of the Ministry of Defense.37 Prime Minister Nuri was caught trying to 
flee Baghdad, disguised beneath an abaya. Said Aburish provided an account of what 
followed: 
Dressed as a woman, he feebly tried to face them with a pistol. They killed him, 
ran their cars back and forth over his body, buried him, then disinterred him and 
tore what remained into small scraps. His fingers and other parts of his body were 
paraded by people in the matter of a football trophy.38 
 
Angry mobs proceeded to storm the Baghdad Hotel. Among the victims killed were a 
group of Jordanian officials dispatched to Baghdad to discuss the formation of the Arab 
Union. With their deaths, any hopes of creating a local counterbalance to the UAR were 
forever dashed. Qasim and Arif did not condone such spectacles of violence, but nor 
could they stop it, for such was the anger of the Iraqi people. The Iraqi people had gotten 
their revenge.  
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 The 1958 coup sent US policymakers into a panic. Eisenhower remarked that 
“This somber turn of events could, without vigorous response on our part, result in a 
complete elimination of Western influence in the Middle East.”39 Secretary of State 
Dulles said that “Iraq today is the most dangerous spot on earth.”40 Every political 
element in Iraq that had been opposed to the monarchy, including communists and 
Nasserists, came into the open. The US believed that another Nasserist coup had just 
unfolded. Nasser did little to alleviate this fear. In fact, he was supportive of the coup, 
and believed its leaders would move to join the UAR. Shortly after the coup, he flew to 
Syria, and gave a speech at Aleppo in support of the Iraqi coup. He took the additional 
step of stationing a squadron of Egyptian Mig jets in Syria to deter any attempt at 
thwarting the coup.41 Surrounded from both sides by Nasserist states, so the US believed, 
Lebanon and Jordan would fall imminently as well, and it was felt that military 
intervention might be necessary. The next escalation in the crisis was the US military 
deployment in Lebanon, and British deployment in Jordan.  
 Fearing that an Iraq-style coup was about to happen in his country, or so he told 
the US, Lebanese President Camille Chamoun evoked the Eisenhower Doctrine. 
Motivated more by seeking external support to prop up his tenuous rule in a midst of a 
civil than of a Nasserist takeover, Chamoun promptly demanded US military 
intervention, as well as the entry of the Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean within 48 
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hours.42 The US obliged, and deployed over 14,000 Marines to Beirut. In Jordan, King 
Hussein claimed to have discovered a coup plot within the army, organized by pro-Syrian 
and pro-Egyptian elements.43 After arresting over 40 officers, King Hussein requested 
British military intervention to shore up his rule. Hussein was especially fearful after 
watching his royal cousins in Iraq executed.  
 At the very minimum, the Anglo-American intervention was aimed at preventing 
the fall of Jordan and Lebanon. In the worst-case scenario, it looked as if the US and 
Britain were ready to strike Iraq. Indeed, invasion of Iraq was considered. Israel’s Prime 
Minister David Ben Gurion stated that if Turkey and Iran received US backing, the Iraqi 
revolution could be crushed.44 In a cable to US ambassador to Iraq, Walter John Gallman, 
it was suggested that the US Marines in Beirut “might be used to loyal Iraqi troops to 
counter-attack.” However, Gallman continued, “No one in Iraq could be found in Iraq to 
collaborate with. Everybody was for the revolution.”45 Not only did an invasion of Iraq 
seem imminent, but so did a wider conflagration throughout the region. 
 Soon after, several events brought about a diffusion of the crisis. In Baghdad, 
after a protracted argument with Arif, Qasim emerged on top. Arif was sympathetic to 
Nasser, and wanted to join Iraq to the UAR, while Qasim maintained an Iraq-first policy, 
and objected. Arif is said to have offered Nasser to kill Qasim, yet Nasser advised against 
this move. Qasim then moved to alleviate western fears. In a meeting with British 
Ambassador Michael Wright, Qasim assured the ambassador that the revolution was a 
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purely internal matter, and that Iraq had no intention of joining the UAR. He said that 
Iraq would not interrupt the flow of oil, or interfere with foreign business interests, and 
that there was no need to launch an attack from Lebanon and Jordan.46 
 In the US, cooler heads prevailed. The State Department urged caution, stating “in 
our opinion any move by force from the outside into Iraq would meet with very little 
Iraqi support and its success would be highly unlikely. Furthermore, since the signing of 
the Mutual Defense Agreement yesterday, Nasser and the Syrians would promptly come 
to the aid of the Republic of Iraq.”47 Further reports followed, giving the US more 
optimism: 
Reports reaching us from Baghdad indicate that the new regime in Iraq (1) desires 
friendly relations with the West, (2) will maintain existing international 
agreements, (3) at least for the time being will retain membership in the Baghdad 
Pact, (4) will not nationalize the production of oil, (5) recognizes the UAR but is 
not joining. 
 
Although the new government came to power in an extremely bloody and 
completely illegal way, there can be no doubt that its popular support is far 
broader than that behind King Faisal. Furthermore, although the Republic of Iraq 
has indicated its plans to establish relations with the Soviet Union and other 
communist countries, Communist influence in the government appears so far to 
be limited48 
 
The final reassurance came from a meeting between Qasim and Ambassador Gallman in 
Baghdad. Qassim reiterated the points documented above, and told the ambassador “We 
Iraqis want to be friends with the US.”49 With that, the crisis was diffused, for the time 
being at least. 
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 Tensions soon flared up once again, slowly but surely. Despite Qasim’s 
assurances that Iraq wished to maintain good relations with the US, the offices of the 
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and US Information Services (USIS) 
remained closed and inaccessible to US personnel.50 US policymakers spoke among 
themselves of the increasing power of the communists. Qasim made clear his intent not to 
hand Iraq to the UAR, resulting in a bitter feud with Nasser. On this point, the US was 
reassured, but on Qasim allowing communists to operate openly and accepting their 
support, the US grew weary. Some analyses were more forgiving, with one stating that 
“Kassem must accept some communist support or stand alone against Nasser.”51 In 
another, more pessimistic analysis, Qasim was “the doop or the willing tool of the 
communists”, or was too fearful of launching a crackdown and risking being 
overthrown.52 The ICP was seen as a ticking time bomb. According to a February 1959 
Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), the ICP favoured a slow creep to power, 
as opposed to a sudden coup.53  
 The danger of a communist takeover was more than an abstract matter of politics 
and ideology. Buried beneath the jargon of fighting communism, US interests in Iraq 
were very clear. According to a State Department memorandum, “The principal Western 
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interest in Iraq (apart from denying the area to the USSR) is oil.”54 As with many 
nationalist revolutions, there was a lingering fear of resource nationalization. This fear 
had prompted the US to engage in covert operations against leaders such as Muhammad 
Mossadegh of Iran and Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala. Even measures short of 
nationalization, such as simply demanding better terms under existing agreements, were 
anathema to the US. It was this potential scenario in Iraq which worried the US. As was 
stated in the 1959 SNIE: 
A Communist-controlled Iraq would also threaten Western access to Middle 
Eastern oil. Although we estimate that such a government might initially prove 
fairly reasonable with permitting continued Western access to Iraqi oil - in the 
interests of receiving continued revenue and of avoiding drastic Western response 
- it would at a minimum insist on substantial modifications in the terms and 
conditions under which Iraqi oil flows to the West. In any case the future of the 
Iraq Petroleum Company would be unpromising indeed - with ultimate 
nationalization likely.55 
 
 Indeed, events appeared to be moving in this direction, fitting neatly into US 
predictions. In late-1958, the USSR signed its first ever arms deal with Iraq.56 In 
February 1959, after the resignation of six ministers, Qasim appointed six communist 
replacements.57 For the US, the final straw came in March, when Iraq withdrew from the 
Baghdad Pact. Deprived of its founding member, the Pact was geographically divided in 
half, and renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).  
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 With Iraq acting too independently of Western interests, the US sought out a 
strategy to contain and undermine Iraq, and even contemplated alternatives to Qasim. 
Among the elements identified as possible alternatives included nationalists, Baathists, 
and military officers.58 Events in Iraq had led the US to shift its attention from the UAR 
to Iraq. Faced with a convergence of interests, Nasser and the US agreed to engage in 
limited cooperation to contain, if not undermine and usurp Qasim. “Nasser is the only 
acceptable source of outside support left to Iraqi Nationalist elements who may wish to 
move against the present regime,” read a State Department policy paper. It continued: 
“Any accomodation with Iraq would, therefore, have to be in the nature of a limited 
experiment.”59 Nasser was more than happy to oblige.  
 In 1960, despite the trials and tribulations, and several violent conflagrations, 
Qasim was firmly in power. Part of this can be attributed to the broad support for Qasim 
from the Iraqi people. Unlike previous Iraqi rulers, Qasim tried, and in many cases 
succeeded in bringing improvement to the lives of ordinary Iraqis. Two weeks after 
toppling the monarchy, the Republican government abolished the Tribal Criminal and 
Civil Disputes Regulation, breaking the grip of the feudal tribal sheikhs over the rural 
population. Shortly after, Qasim implemented sweeping land reforms, putting a ceiling on 
individual land ownership, and launching a land redistribution campaign. By 1966, 
Qasim’s land reform program granted land to over 300,000 families, many of whom had 
previously been landless and/or working as sharecroppers.60 In 1960, in order to curb the 
explosion of slums in Baghdad, Qasim ordered the construction of Madinat al-Thawra 
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(Revolution City) in the suburbs of Baghdad. Over 25,000 units of affordable housing 
were constructed, together with schools and hospitals, giving many of Baghdad’s poorest 
inhabitants access to running water and plumbing, electricity, medical facilities, and 
schooling.61 In order to continue the momentum of reforms, the Iraqi state had to obtain 
more money. To do so, it would demand greater say in the production and sale of its 
largest resource: oil.  
 Qasim’s first move was to lend support to a multinational initiative to give oil 
producing states greater control over their oil reserves. In 1960, Venezuela and Saudi 
Arabia explored the option of forming a cartel with other oil-producing states. Qasim 
supported the initiative, and hosted a meeting in September in Baghdad to discuss the 
matter. Iran and Kuwait were also in attendance. The Venezuelan delegation put forth a 
proposal, and all members voted unanimously, creating the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC).62  
 Qasim’s next, more ambitious effort, was to bring Kuwait back under Iraqi 
control. Like King Ghazi and Nuri al-Said before him, Qasim revived Iraq’s claim to 
Kuwait. In 1899, Sheikh Mubarak al-Sabah, the emir of Kuwait, signed a treaty with 
Britain, making Kuwait into a British protectorate. In 1961, Britain granted independence 
to Kuwait, withdrawing its forces from the newly-independent emirate. In the absence of 
the British, Qasim saw an opportune moment to revive Iraqi claims to Kuwait. At a 25 
June press conference, Qasim made an offer to “liberate” Kuwait, claiming that Kuwait 
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was “an indivisible part of Iraq” and “it is the Iraqi Republic and no one else which signs 
agreements for Kuwait.”63  
 Amid the Kuwait crisis, Qasim took the additional step of partially nationalizing 
the IPC. With the passing of Law 80, all IPC concession territories not being exploited 
were put under the control of the state, while existing areas of production were to remain 
under IPC control. Qasim realized that full nationalization would lead to a shutdown of 
oil production, and thus sought to tread a fine line between state and popular demand for 
greater control of oil, and not fully alienating the companies of the IPC.64 The US reacted 
with hostility, charging Qasim with a “unilateral violation of a major economic 
arrangement with Iraq.”65 
 The US opposed the partial IPC nationalization for two reasons. First, the US 
consortium in the IPC still held the original 23.75 percent share first agreed upon in 1921, 
and intended to extract as much value as possible from its concession. Second, the threat 
to US interests posed by partial nationalization would have been magnified if Qasim were 
to successfully annex Kuwait and its enormous oil reserves. “If he can add Kuwait 
production (largest in ME) to that of IPC,” warned National Security Council advisor 
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Robert Komer, “he’ll have stranglehold on ME oil.”66 To have one state have the ability 
to rival pro-US oil producers such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, was deemed unacceptable.  
 On the Kuwaiti front, the Iraqi military amassed in force along the border. It 
appeared that an invasion was imminent. Were an invasion to take place, it would be over 
in a matter of hours. The US was alarmed by the escalating crisis, but was unwilling to 
intervene. The most it was willing to do was to conduct reconnaissance on Iraqi maritime 
activity. “The reason for this,” read a State Department memorandum, “is that there are 
twelve motor torpedo boats, some with partly Russian crews, at Basra at the moment and 
reports of Iraqi troops being sent to Fao which may indicate the intention of the Iraqis to 
on some maritime adventure.”67 Potential conflict with the USSR was not a risk US 
policymakers were willing to take. The British, however, were undeterred, and 
immediately redeployed to Kuwait.68  
 With the US hesitant to intervene, and the British too eager to intervene, it was 
the Arabs who played the decisive role in bringing the crisis to an end, most notably 
Nasser. Qasim hoped that by standing up to the British, he would enjoy widespread 
support from the Arab world. Quite unexpectedly and ironically, Qasim was met by 
condemnation from other Arab governments, especially from Nasser. Just as Qasim 
dashed Nasser’s dream of expanding the UAR into Iraq, so would Nasser dash Qasim’s 
hope of annexing Kuwait. Nasser was to do so by supporting Kuwait’s successful bid to 
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join the Arab League, which was to condemn Qasim. On 20 July, the Arab League passed 
a 5-point Saudi-proposed resolution calling for Iraq to cease its threats and belligerency, 
for League members to support Kuwaiti entry, for a British military withdrawal, and for 
the deployment of an Arab League peacekeeping force to Kuwait.69 Facing Arab League 
condemnation, and the deployment of a peacekeeping force manned largely by Egyptians 
right under Iraq’s nose, Qasim realized he was almost completely isolated, and backed 
down. With the British withdrawal and replacement with an Arab League peacekeeping 
force, the threat of war receded.  
 After Qasim backed down, the US doomsday scenario of an Iraqi “stranglehold 
on ME oil” did not come to fruition. Nonetheless, under Qasim, there existed a powerful 
countercurrent to oil producers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia which, despite their 
membership in OPEC, remained generally accommodating to the US and its demand for 
low oil prices. Additionally, were Qasim’s project to have progressed even further and 
been successful, it could set a precedent for other states to follow. Partial nationalization, 
it was feared, was a stepping stone to full nationalization. With US-Iraq relations at their 
lowest, if not lower than during the 1958 revolution, the US was eager to see Qasim 
replaced.  
 What remains unclear is to what extent the US worked toward replacing Qasim. 
Several academics and journalists, including Hugh Wilford, Tim Weiner, and Said 
Aburish, allege that in February 1960, the CIA engaged in a botched effort to assassinate 
Qasim. The source of this allegation is the 1975 Senate Select Committee report Alleged 
Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, which made mention of “a ‘special 
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operation’ to ‘incapacitate’ an Iraqi colonel believed to be “promoting Soviet bloc 
political interests in Iraq.”70 Many have interpreted this as an attempt to assassinate 
Qasim. However, Qasim held the rank of brigadier, not colonel. Whether this was a 
recording error, or whether this was a reference to another Iraqi official or to Qasim 
remains to be seen.  
 What is clear is that the US was exploring possible candidates to replace Qasim. 
One of the candidates the US took note of was the Iraqi branch  of the Arab Socialist 
Ba'ath Party. On its face, this would appear to be an unlikely partnership, with Arab 
nationalism and socialism being anathema to the US. However, there were some common 
interests, namely hostility towards Qasim and his communist supporters. This fact was 
duly noted in a State Department document which identified the Ba’ath Party as a likely 
source of opposition to Qasim’s cabinet reshuffle and appointment of communists.71 This 
opposition was best demonstrated on 7 October 1959, when a Ba'ath hit squad which 
included a young Saddam Hussein ambushed Qasim on his commute through Baghdad. 
By almost all accounts, the assassination attempt was a dismal failure. Qasim survived 
the ambush despite two bullet wounds in the arm and shoulder. Several Ba'athists were 
killed or wounded, likely due to the crossfire from their fellow gunmen.   
 Despite their initial failure, the Ba'ath made another attempt to come to power. 
Unable to topple Qasim on their own, the Ba'ath entered into an uneasy alliance with 
Nasserists, Iraqi nationalists, and military leaders. On 8 November 1963, this alliance 
formed a cabal and launched a coup. Leading the coup was Qasim’s former protege Arif, 
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who was spared from a death sentence and released in 1961. As was expected by the 
coup plotters, the coup was met with immediate resistance in the streets, from 
communists and non-communists. With Qasim’s government under siege, his most 
fervent supporters demanded to be armed. Despite the dire situation, Qasim refused to 
arm civilians and put them in harm’s way. Despite Qasim’s capture, resistance in the 
streets continued. The new junta determined that if the resistance was to be crushed, 
Qasim would need to be executed. Thus, Qasim was taken to a studio in Baghdad for trial 
and execution. Qasim refused to play along with the charade of this kangaroo court. 
Before being executed, Qasim shouted “long live the Iraqi people!”72 The execution was 
broadcast on a loop throughout the day, in order to eliminate any doubt among Qasim’s 
supporters that he was dead. In order to consolidate its gains and root out communists and 
other opposition, the Arif junta unleashed the Ba’athists, who embarked on a series of 
purges, kidnappings, death squads, and public executions. Among the participants of the 
repressions was Saddam. Said Aburish details what transpired:  
Saddam Hussein, who had rushed back to Iraq from exile in Cairo to join the 
victors, was personally involved in the torture of leftists in the separate detention 
centres for the fellaheen or peasants, and the muthaqafeen, or educated class. And, 
tellingly, the eliminations were done mainly on an individual basis, house-to-
house visits by hit squads who knew where their victims were and carried out on-
the-spot executions. This explains the killing of seven out of the thirteen-man 
Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party - most after they were hideously 
tortured. The British Committee for Human Rights in Iraq, one of the few 
international groups to investigate what happened after the coup, confirmed all 
this in a 1964 report and compared the Ba’athist hit squads to ‘Hitlerian shock 
troops’.73 
 
For the US, the coup was a welcome development. According to Richard Murphy, 
a former diplomat and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian 
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affairs, “The fact that there had been an enormously bloody put-down of the communists 
in Baghdad was surely welcome news in Washington.”74 What remains to be seen is to 
what extent the coup was influenced by US covert action. While the US did desire for 
Qasim to be overthrown, there is little in the way of declassified documents which shed 
any light on the US role in the 1963 coup. Clearly, the US had an interest in the coup 
succeeding. As it unfolded, the CIA and State Department judged that “if the coup is 
successful, relations between the U.S. and Iraq will be considerably improved.”75 While 
this does not prove the US played a central role in the coup, several sources are adamant 
that the US was deeply involved. According to James Akins, a former US diplomat 
stationed in Baghdad from 1961 to 1965:  
Personally, I considered it a real triumph of the CIA. They didn’t have very many 
of them, there were alot of coup attempts that had gone sour, but this one worked 
and it was for a good cause. I think it was a very good thing that happened.76 
 
Roger Morris, a former White House advisor, stated:  
There was a major involvement in the 1963 coup, and arms were flown 
clandestinely from Turkey. A lot of money, a lot of financial support, CIA 
planning was involved in the early stages of the coup. Now the Ba’ath was, of 
course, extremely eager to take power, but they did need American help.77 
 
On the Iraqi side, former Ba’ath interior minister Ali Saleh al-Saadi remarked “We came 
to power on a CIA train.”78 In the absence of declassified material on the subject, and 
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with only public statements from former US officials, what role the US played in the 
1963 coup remains an open question. 
 Questions of CIA complicity notwithstanding, relations between the US and Arif 
junta began amicably. Early assessments of the new government were optimistic. With 
Qasim out of the way, and Nasser at odds with the US over the civil war in Yemen, the 
new Iraqi government “[set] up a new power pole in the Arab world in fact competing 
with Nasser.”79 Most importantly, with Ba’athist doctrine calling for a mixed economy, 
“there is a wide scope for private enterprise.”80 The US was very eager to get back to 
business, and took a number of steps to ensure the consolidation of the new government. 
One such step was a series of arms sales. For fiscal year 1964, the US approved the sale 
of 40 light tanks, 12 tank transporters, 500 heavy trucks, 15 large helicopters, 5 F-86 
fighter aircraft, and 13 howitzers.81 The aim of the sales was two-fold. The first was to 
revive western arms sales to Iraq, previously severed under Qasim, and “with the ultimate 
objective of having Iraq, and hopefully Syria, look to the West as the primary source for 
necessary armaments.”82 The second was to assist the Iraqi state suppress the most recent 
Kurdish rebellion. Although it was not openly acknowledged to be the goal by US 
policymakers, what was acknowledged was that Iraq’s most pressing military concern at 
the time was the Kurdish rebellion.83 Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff anticipated 
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the Kurds to object to US arms sales, yet it was determined that “it’s more important to 
be responsive to the new regime.”84  
On the business front, the US encouraged its companies to resume business in 
Iraq.85 “In particular,’ read a State Department report, “US businessmen should be 
encouraged to seek opportunities in Iraq,” which was “the second most populous and 
potentially powerful state in the Eastern Arab world after the UAR, and has a viable 
economy.”86Additionally, the US began delivering food and agriculture aid via Public 
Law 480 (PL 480).87  
Before the year was over, new developments would cast doubt on earlier 
optimistic assessments of the new Iraqi government. Ten months after the coup, 
prompted in part by the Ba’athist streak of violence, and internal power struggles, the 
military faction under Colonel Arif sidelined the Ba’ath. Some Ba’athists were exiled, 
while others, like Saddam Hussein, were arrested. Arif assumed power for himself, and 
the Ba’ath were driven underground once more. With Arif, “a supporter of Nasser”, 
leading Iraq, the US feared a “resurgence of Nasser’s influence in the Arab world.”88  
 Making matters worse was Arif's overtures to the USSR. Although Iraq 
maintained a non-aligned posture, and maintained closer relations with the US after 
Qasim’s fall, Arif sought closer relations with the USSR. Arif’s Prime Minister, Subhi 
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Abdul Hamed, suggested that he do so through Nasser. In May of 1964, the opportunity 
presented itself. Arif was invited to commencement ceremonies commemorating the 
beginning of construction on the Aswan Dam. Also in attendance was Soviet Premier 
Nikita Khrushchev. Prime Minister Hamed organized the first meeting between Arif and 
Khrushchev. After this meeting, Hamed explained: 
Iraqi delegations started going to Moscow to ratify new agreements. That’s when 
the Americans felt that they were about to lose Iraq for good. We favored the 
Soviet Union over the United States.89  
 
As Soviet-Iraqi ties expanded, US-Iraq relations hit a new low in 1967. In protest 
to US support for Israel during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Iraq severed diplomatic 
relations with the US.90 In a report of a meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan 
Pachachi, a US diplomat paraphrased Pachachi as having said: 
He noted that in the Suez crisis of 1956 the United States had immediately and 
forcibly publicly stated that Israel would not be allowed any territorial gains. This 
time the United States had not done the same thing and had shown an utter lack of 
concern for the Arabs or considerations for their feelings.91 
 
 Once more, the US and Iraq became estranged. Although the US was content to 
see Qasim executed, the changes which followed were not entirely to their liking. With 
US policy during the most recent Arab-Israeli War, relations hit a low point. However, 
this rift would not last long. New regional developments slowly brought the US and Iraq 
closer together. A new phase in US-Iraq relations was beginning.  
 In this first phase of relations, the US developed a flawed framework for dealing 
with Iraq, one which would last for the duration of the relationship. US interests were 
clear enough: to keep Iraqi oil flowing, and to keep communism out.  In the interests of 
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US global power, and in the midst of the Cold War, the US believed it could influence 
and manipulate Iraq as it saw fit. Very much like their British colonial predecessors, the 
US adopted a divide-and-conquer strategy, believing it could to so in a controlled 
manner. With the growing rift between the Arif government and the US, it should have 
been abundantly clear that there were limits to US power in Iraq. Instead, what unfolded 
was a paradoxical phenomenon: the more the US tried to exert control over events in 
Iraq, the more unstable the situation became.  
 
The Cynical Enterprise: The Rise of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party 
 1968 marked a turning point in US-Iraq relations. Despite their deep misgivings 
about each other, the US and Iraq became increasingly reliant on each other as a means to 
achieve their respective goals. In July of that year, the Ba'ath regrouped and launched a 
coup, claiming sole power over Iraq. With Egypt's fall from grace following its defeat in 
the 1967 War, and Nasser's death in 1970, the Iraqi Ba'ath saw an opening to claim the 
supreme leadership role in the Arab world. In order to do so, Iraq embarked on an 
ambitious civilian and military modernization program, one which could be used to rally 
the Arab world behind the US. To launch this program, Iraq needed the input of the West, 
especially the US. In order to contain regional threats such as communism, the US 
needed Iraq. Although this new phase got off to a rough start, the relationship grew to the 
point that US policymakers spoke of a tilt toward Iraq. In the course of this uneasy 
alliance, the US engaged in a series of short-sighted and detrimental policies which led to 
the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction in the Middle East, and destabilization of the region.  
35 
 The tacit alliance which emerged between the US and Iraq was not an alliance in 
the traditional sense, but rather an alliance of convenience. Founded in Syria in 1947 by 
Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar, the Ba'ath Party developed a syncretic ideology 
combining pan-Arab nationalism with socialism and anti-imperialism. The Party utilized 
slogans such as "One Arab nation with an eternal mission," and "Unity, Liberty, 
Socialism." All of these ideologies were anathema to the US. However, the Ba'ath had a 
propensity for ruthlessness and violence, best explained by Aflaq: "When we are cruel to 
others, we know that our cruelty is meant to bring them back to their true selves."92 These 
qualities were valued by the US when it came to containing threats such as communism 
or the spread of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. As journalist Adel Darwish 
reported, the US viewed Ba'athists such as Saddam as "our man that we can actually use, 
he will be absolutely and totally ruthless."93 Only as regional developments brought the 
two states together could the US harness this ruthlessness.  
 On 17 July 1968, the Ba’athists launched their comeback, when Ba’athist officers 
within the Iraqi military launched a coup. By all accounts, the coup itself was swift and 
bloodless. Unlike past Iraqi coups, the deposed leader was allowed to live. President Abd 
al-Rahman Arif was surrounded, and did not bother to fight back. Instead of killing Arif, 
the Ba’athists demanded that he surrender power and enter exile in London. The task of 
announcing the plotters’ intentions to Arif fell on General Hardan al-Tikriti. After a few 
words of protest, Arif accepted the plotters’ demands, but on the condition that he be 
allowed to have a last cup of tea with his deposer.94 Soon after, the Ba’athists established 
the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) as the supreme ruling body of the Iraqi 
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state, and appointed Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr as chairman. In turn, Bakr appointed his 
cousin Saddam Hussein as vice chairman.95  
 With his appointment to vice chairman of the RCC, Saddam set out to consolidate 
the power of the new government through a reign of terror. As historian Adeed Dawisha 
explained: 
As an Admirer of Joseph Stalin, Husayn well realized the value of the infamous 
1930s purges to the longevity of the Soviet dictator’s absolutist rule. Matching 
Stalin’s ruthlessness and manipulative acumen, he spent the first two years 
consolidating his hold on power by promoting to positions of influence in the 
party and the security organizations men who were loyal to him personally, and 
eliminating potential rivals by uncovering real and imagined plots against the 
government.96  
 
In one particularly gruesome and well-publicized episode, Saddam was to apply the 
lessons of Stalin with a show trial of his own. In December 1968, the government 
announced it had arrested 30 men which it claimed had been spying for Israel. Saddam 
turned the episode into a public spectacle, filling the newspapers, airwaves, and 
televisions with news from the show trials. The trials lasted until January 1969, when 
fourteen of the suspected thirty were sentenced to death, and publicly hanged at 
Liberation Square. The bodies were left suspended for over a day, with radio broadcasts 
in Baghdad urging the public to witness firsthand “what happens to enemies of the 
revolution.”97  
 Initially, the US was at a loss as to how to react to the new regime. What was 
clear from the beginning is that Saddam was increasingly becoming the real power 
behind President Bakr. As vice president, Saddam was given wide authorities to appoint 
officials within many of Iraq’s ministries, which he exploited by slowly filling with his 
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loyal confidants. According to former CIA analyst Stephen Pelletiere, “we knew of 
course from ‘68 on that he was the real power behind the throne, but we didn’t attach any 
particular significance to him apart that he was a very ruthless guy, very tough.”98 
Despite his ruthlessness, Saddam was also very pragmatic. According to former CIA 
analyst Judith Yaphe:  
There was a time through the early ‘70s when Saddam is a very visible presence 
to the kind of modernization and Westernization that many Iraqis were hoping 
for. He wore western suits, he talked about education, modernization, bringing in 
the West.99 
 
By contrast, Said Aburish described Saddam's push for modernization as "to drag Iraq 
into the 20th century by its hairs, kicking and screaming."100 
 When it came to the Cold War divide, the Bakr-Saddam duo skillfully exploited 
the animosity between the two superpowers, playing both off of each other to extract as 
much aid as possible, on the best terms as possible. US policymakers effectively failed to 
devise a policy for the new government. US diplomat Richard Murphy stated that in 
debating whether or not to develop cordial or hostile relations, “at least superficially, it 
looks like we floated back and forth.”101 Similarly, in the coming years, the US pursued 
contradictory hostile and cordial policies simultaneously, further reflecting the lack of a 
well-thought out policy.  
 Initially it seemed that US attitudes towards the Ba’athists was more hostile than 
cordial. On the one hand, many policymakers and analysts recognized that Saddam’s 
anti-western rhetoric was in large part aimed at a domestic audience, and that in reality he 
was more than willing to deal with the West. On the other hand, more skeptical 
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policymakers pointed out that whatever Saddam’s intentions, Iraq maintained closer 
relations with the USSR. In 1968, for example, Iraq turned to the USSR for two projects: 
the development of the North Rumelia oil field, one of the largest in Iraq, and 
construction of a deep-water port at Um Qasr.102 For pessimists, most notably Secretary 
of State Henry Kissinger, the final indicator of Iraq’s stance came in 1972, when Saddam 
and Bakr met Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin and signed the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation, paving the way for greater economic and military 
cooperation. Perhaps the most alarming element of the treaty was the provision granting 
the Soviet Navy ships port call rights at Um Qasr in the Persian Gulf.103 As US energy 
dependency in the Persian Gulf grew, it increasingly sought to become the dominant 
power in the Gulf. With a Soviet toehold in the Gulf, the US lashed out at Iraq.  
 The US was not the only country to notice. Iran and Israel duly noted Iraq’s 
seemingly growing tilt toward the USSR. According to historian and analyst Trita Parsi, 
“Iraq’s power was still rising, and Washington, Tehran, and Tel Aviv viewed Baghdad’s 
pro-Soviet tilt, anti-Iranian orientation, and pan-Arab tendencies with great concern.”104 
Just as Iraq signed a Friendship Treaty with the Soviets, the same year, Bakr and Saddam 
revived the unresolved issue of oil nationalization, first addressed by Qasim. Under 
Qasim, only areas which were not being exploited were nationalized, leaving existing 
areas of production to the Iraq Petroleum Company. Furthermore, many aspects of 
Qasim’s program had yet to be implemented, and the Iraq Petroleum Company remained 
as a powerful force. When negotiations with the IPC did not produce the desired result, 
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Saddam and Bakr moved to completely nationalize the Iraqi oil industry. The IPC was 
abolished and replaced by the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC), an entity which was 
placed under the control of the state. According to historian Charles Tripp:  
Iraq was now well-placed to derive full benefit from the massive rises in oil prices 
which were to follow the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. These were also to place 
unimaginable wealth in the in the hands of a small circle of men who controlled 
the Iraqi state, providing them with a means of patronage that far exceeded 
anything available to their predecessors.105  
 
The US policy debate remained confused, yet it had already been decided to 
pressure and punish Iraq. The prospect of a powerful, centralized state with full control 
over its most abundant natural resource, a pan-Arab orientation (albeit a lesser form 
where individual Arab states rally behind a powerful vanguard state) and pro-Soviet tilt 
was viewed as a threat. This analysis, as will be demonstrated later, was fundamentally 
flawed. Saddam was more than willing to do business with the West, and in fact wanted 
to reduce Iraqi dependency on the USSR. However, amid the debate in US policy circles, 
the pessimist camp led by Kissinger concluded that Iraq had strayed too far, and had to be 
pressured and pushed closer back to the West. In order to do so, the US joined Iran and 
Israel in rousing the Iraqi Kurds into rebellion.  
To launch the covert operation, Israel, Iran, and the US turned to Mullah Mustafa 
Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), the most powerful political 
faction in Iraqi Kurdistan.  For the US and Iran, the Marxist, Soviet-connected Barzani 
made for an odd partner. During World War II, the USSR and Britain invaded Iran to 
depose the pro-German Shah and secure the flow of Lend-Lease supplies to the USSR. 
Immediately after the war, the USSR was reluctant to leave, and backed Barzani’s effort 
to carve out an independent Marxist enclave in northwest Iran called the Mahabad 
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Republic. Stalin hoped to use Mahabad as a buffer, as well as to prospect and exploit its 
oil.106 This, and the Soviet refusal to withdraw from Iran led to a standoff with the US 
and Britain, in which the USSR backed down. After Mahabad was crushed by Iranian 
forces, Barzani fled to the USSR, where he resided until eventually settling in Iraqi 
Kurdistan. Now, despite his reputation as a “Red Mullah”, Barzani found himself in the 
embrace of the US. In May of 1972, after a visit to Moscow, President Richard Nixon 
and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stopped in Tehran on the way home. Among the 
topics discussed with the Shah was support for a Kurdish insurrection, which began 
shortly afterwards.107  
Of course, no party involved genuinely wanted the Iraqi Kurds to establish an 
autonomous state. For the Shah, supporting the Kurds was a game with fire. A successful 
attempt to establish an autonomous state in Iraqi Kurdistan could set an example for 
Iranian Kurds to follow. Nor did the US want to see such a development take place. 
According to the final report of the 1975 House Select Committee on Intelligence 
(commonly known as the Pike Committee), the US aim was only to pressure Iraq and 
stretch its resources thin. Citing a CIA document, the Pike Committee reported:  
We would think that Iran would not look with favor on the establishment of a 
formalized autonomous government. Iran, like ourselves, has seen benefit in a 
stalemate situation … in which Iraq is intrinsically weakened by the Kurds’ 
refusal to relinquish semi-autonomy. Neither Iran nor ourselves wish to see the 
matter resolved one way or the other.  
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The Pike Report added to this by saying “this policy was not imparted to our clients, who 
were encouraged to continue fighting. Even in the context of covert action, ours was a 
cynical enterprise.”108  
 Thus, the Kurdish insurgency dragged on, with no decisive victories between the 
KDP or the Iraqi government. When the 1973 Arab-Israeli War erupted, and Iraq 
deployed to the Syrian front, the Kurds saw an opportunity to launch a major offensive. 
Israel advised the Kurds to follow through, but the US objected, stating “we do not repeat 
not consider it advisable for you to undertake the offensive military actions that Israel has 
suggested to you.”109  
 In 1975, the unexpected happened. On the sidelines of the 1975 OPEC summit in 
Algiers, the Shah pulled the rug out from under the feet of the Kurds, Israelis, and the 
US, by sitting down with Saddam. The Shah determined that he had put sufficient 
pressure on Iraq, and that the time was ripe for negotiations. Saddam agreed upon 
demarcating the Shatt al-Arab waterway along the thalweg (deepest point), thereby 
resolving the original dispute between Iran and Iraq. With the signing of the Algiers 
Accords, Iran ceased its support of the Iraqi Kurds. The agreement came as a shock to the 
US and Israel, none of which had been consulted by the Shah beforehand.  
 Now in a desperate situation, the Kurds pleaded to the CIA for help:  
There is confusion and dismay among our forces and people. Our people’s fate is 
in unprecedented danger. Complete destruction hanging over our head. No 
explanation for all this. We appeal to you and USG [United States Government] 
intervene according to your promises.110  
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No help was forthcoming. The US left the fate of the Kurds to the Iraqi military. The Pike 
Report detailed what followed:  
Over 200,000 refugees managed to escape into Iran. Once there, however, neither 
the United States nor Iran extended adequate humanitarian assistance. In fact, Iran 
was later to forcibly return over 40,000 of the refugees and the United States 
government refused even one refugee into the United States by way of political 
asylum even though they qualified for such assistance.111  
 
When questioned about this duplicity, Kissinger said “covert action should not be 
confused with missionary work.”112  
 The entire endeavor of rousing the Kurds proved to be entirely unnecessary as far 
as US objectives were concerned. Although Iraq enjoyed close relations with the USSR, 
it was by no means solely loyal to the Soviets, and was more than willing to work with 
the West. After the Arab members of OPEC launched an oil embargo in protest of US 
support for Israel during the 1973 war, global oil prices quadrupled, and Iraq found itself 
flooded with record-breaking levels of oil revenue. This flood of revenue enabled 
Saddam to finance his envisioned overhaul of Iraq, and created a veritable business 
bonanza for foreign companies. By rousing the Kurds, the US restricted and 
disadvantaged its own presence in the Iraqi market, to the benefit of its western European 
allies. As Saddam explained to a group of Arab journalists in 1974:  
We have no fear of dealing with any state in the world, with the exception 
of the Zionist entity which we do not consider as a state and with whom we have 
no intention of cooperating, ever. The severing of diplomatic relations with the 
United States of America [after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War] was a political attitude 
based on principle … But we have no reservations about dealing with companies 
anywhere around the world, on the basis that guarantees respect of our 
sovereignty and ensures both parties a legitimate profit.  
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 Our country has large-scale projects, prodigious projects, and we have 
great ambitions. The idea that we might isolate ourselves from the world to live 
according to our own devices is foreign to us, and we refuse it categorically.  
 Iraq today has contracts with American and West European companies. 
We are cooperating with numerous Western states, and with all the Socialist 
states, without exception.113  
 
 It should be noted that in June 1972, a mere two months after signing a treaty with 
the Soviets, Saddam flew to Paris and conducted a series of arms deals with France.114 As 
much as the US was concerned about growing Iraqi-Soviet ties, the French arms deals 
proved that Iraq was far from a Soviet puppet. As was the case under Qasim, where even 
the most basic revision of terms within existing agreements on oil production were 
viewed unfavorably, the US viewed Iraqi relations with the USSR in terms of a zero sum 
game. Although US companies were already present in Iraq, they were fewer in number, 
and at a disadvantage to foreign competitors. For the remainder of the decade, US 
companies would sit in the shadows of their Western European competitors. However, 
they would not be far behind. For many of Iraq’s projects to succeed, they would need 
access to western high-technology goods, especially those from the US.  
 In order to obtain US and Western technology for both military and civilian 
purposes, President Bakr, Vice President Saddam, and Saddam’s uncle and future 
Defense Minister Adnan Khairallah, and Deputy Prime Minister Adnan Hamdani 
established the Strategic Planning Committee. The short-term aim of the Committee was 
to diversify Iraq’s arms sources to prevent dependency on a single power and offset the 
dangers of an embargo. Its long-term aim was to develop Iraq’s own arms industry, in the 
hopes of becoming the first Arab country to do so.115  
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 The first step in this process occurred in 1972, before the formation of the 
Committee, when Saddam Hussein traveled to Paris and met French President Georges 
Pompidou. Iraq wanted French arms and France wanted oil at concessionary prices. 
Under the deal reached during this meeting, France agreed to sell Iraq 16 Alouette 
helicopters and 128 Panhard armored vehicles.116 The deal was small, but it was a first 
step in the growing Iraqi-western arms trade, and the first in a series of mutually 
reciprocated meetings between French and Iraqi officials.  
 In order to branch out further, and accommodate Iraq’s growing arms imports, the 
Committee solicited the services of the Beirut-based Arab Projects and Development 
(APD). Run by Palestinian construction magnates Kamal Abdul Rahman and Hasib 
Sabbagh, the APD had no prior experience in the armaments industry, but it did have the 
necessary connections to begin to do so. The APD recommended that if Iraq were to be 
the most powerful state in the Arab world, if not the entire Middle East, it would have to 
acquire the arms necessary to achieve military parity with Israel, especially chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons.117 In order to do so, the APD suggested that Iraq begin a 
massive drive to recruit the best and brightest engineers, technicians, and scientists in the 
Arab world and diaspora.  
 For Saddam, one of the most important aims of the Iraqi military was to develop a 
nuclear weapon. Early in 1975, Iraq turned to the USSR. However, the reactor the Soviets 
provided was small, and was not equipped to produce weapons-grade uranium. Rebuffed 
by the USSR, Iraq turned once more to France. Later that year, Saddam flew to Paris to 
meet Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. During the meeting, France agreed to provide Iraq 
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with two Osirak reactors, and provide assistance with construction and development.118  
Shortly after, French technicians arrived at Tuwaitha, where construction of two reactors, 
Tammuz I and Tammuz II, began. As is often the case with dual-use technologies such as 
nuclear technology, there is always the concern of dual military and civilian uses. 
However, Saddam was completely unambiguous about the purpose of the Tuwaitha site. 
In an interview for the Lebanese newspaper al-Usbu al-Arabi, Saddam declared “the 
agreement with France is the first concrete step toward the production of the Arab atomic 
weapon.”119 Such red flags did not alarm the French, who continued to provide their 
assistance to the project. Chirac’s eagerness to conduct business with Iraq was duly noted 
in the French press, who jokingly referred to the Osirak reactors as “O’Chirac”.120 Chirac 
described Iraq as a “veritable bonanza.”121 Over the years, Iraq turned to numerous 
foreign companies to assist in development. For “hot cell” radiation containment units 
and laboratories, Iraq turned to the Italian firm SNIA Technit. For depleted uranium, they 
turned to the West German consortium NUKEM. For computers and processors, Iraq 
turned to the US hi-tech giant Hewlett-Packard. For a germanium detector, Iraq turned to 
the US firm ORTEC.122 
 Obtaining nuclear weapons was a long-term pursuit. In the meanwhile, the APD 
advised that developing chemical and biological weapons could serve as a stopgap. 
Western Iraq was abundant with the phosphate necessary to construct chemical weapons. 
All that was needed was technical assistance in constructing a plant, and the procurement 
of precursor chemicals. Iraq had approached the USSR to request help to construct a 
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chemical weapons plant. The Soviets refused. Next, Iraq turned to Imperial Chemical 
Industries in London, purportedly to help develop pesticides. Alarmed by the Iraqis, who 
sought to synthesize pesticides which were determined to be too deadly, and thus used 
nowhere in the world for this purpose, the British declined to do business. Rebuffed by 
the British, Iraq turned to the US company Pfaulder. After discussions with the Iraqis, 
Pfaulder appeared ready to build a chemicals plant. During the course of discussions, the 
Iraqis obtained blueprints for a chemicals plant. In 1978, citing dual-use concerns, the US 
State Department denied an export license to Iraq. For the Iraqis, it mattered little. 
Equipped with blueprints, the Iraqis turned to several European firms to build the plant 
instead.123 Thus, with blueprints from a US firm, the foundation of the Iraqi chemical 
weapons program was laid.  
 In order to facilitate the Iraqi development program, and in order to ensure long-
term success, the APD recommended an overhaul of the education system. It was not 
enough to merely import Arab scientists and technicians from around the world. 
Although the primary emphasis of education overhaul was aimed at fueling the Iraqi 
armament program, it would have beneficial ramifications for the civil sector as well. 
Using Iraq’s growing oil revenues, primary, secondary, and university education was 
made free, and the number of students enrolled rose dramatically. According to historian 
Adeed Dawisha:  
Between 1973 and 1980, student enrollment in secondary schools rose from 
600,000 to almost a million, and at universities it almost doubled from 49,000 to 
96,000. In the same seven-year period, the number of university teachers 
increased from 1,721 to 6,515. Thousands of Iraqi university graduates, armed 
with generous government scholarships, were arriving in West and East European 
capitals and cities in search of higher degrees.124 
                                                
123 Darwish & Alexander, 140 
124 Dawisha, 220-221 
47 
 
Special emphasis was placed on opening education to girls and women, and opening up 
careers which had historically been closed off or severely restricted to women. As more 
Iraqi women received an education, the more they began to take part in the Iraqi 
workforce. According to Dawisha, “by 1980, women constituted 70 percent of all 
pharmacists, almost half of all teachers and dentists, and just under a third of all 
physicians.”125 For the first time, women were allowed to enlist in the armed forces, and 
enroll in the nation’s military academies.126  
 One of the most notable achievements of the period was Iraq’s literacy drive. In 
1977, Saddam issued a decree to launch a sweeping eradication of illiteracy, making 
literacy classes compulsory for all illiterate men and women.127 In typical Saddam 
fashion, failure to attend literacy classes could be punished with imprisonment, where 
literacy classes were also compulsory.128 Although seemingly harsh, the program proved 
to be tremendously successful. By early 1980, almost 2 million Iraqis had been taught 
rudimentary reading and writing, with more on the way during the coming decade. The 
success of the literacy drive was duly noted by UNESCO, which closely studied the 
program in its efforts to develop similar programs around the world.129  
 The second phase of US-Iraq relations saw the development of an alliance of 
convenience. Although this phase began with deep distrust, demonstrated best by US 
support for the Kurdish rebellion of 1972-1975, outstanding differences were 
overshadowed by shared interests. In the Ba’ath government of Iraq, and especially in 
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Saddam, the US saw a reliable and cutthroat tool to eliminate communism from Iraq, a 
reliable source of oil to the economies of the West, and a cash-strapped customer for 
arms and technology. In the US, Saddam and the Ba’athists found a partner to help 
reduce Iraq’s dependence on the USSR for arms, and a source of arms and technology for 
its modernization drive. Once again, the US operated under the assumption that it could 
manipulate and control Iraqi behavior, regardless of the consequences for millions of 
people in the region. By supporting Saddam with arms and components for the Iraqi 
WMD program, the US entered into a de facto alliance with Iraq. By 1979, with a major 
development in the region, the US found a new use for Iraq.  
 
The New Twin Pillars: The Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War 
 On 16 January 1979, the Middle East was forever changed. On this day, after over 
a year of unrest amid the Iranian Revolution, Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi fled Iran, 
paving the way for the establishment of the independent and anti-American Islamic 
Republic of Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini. With this new development, US-Iraq 
relations came to their closest yet. For the US, the Revolution saw the overthrow of one 
of its staunchest allies in the region, which acted under Nixon’s “Twin Pillars” policy 
(the other pillar being Saudi Arabia) as a beat cop protecting US interests in the Persian 
Gulf. Iraq feared that the Shia Islamist Revolution could spread to its own predominantly-
Shia population. Facing a common threat to their regional interests, the US and Iraq 
partnered up to contain Iran. When Saddam launched the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, the US 
stood with him every step of the way, providing financial aid, diplomatic cover, weapons, 
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and direct intervention in order to prevent an Iranian victory and the collapse of the Iraqi 
government.  
 The US-Iraq relationship of the 1980s came about in large part due to the failure 
of US Iran policy since 1953. US Iraq policy during this period represented an effort to 
contain the blowback of 25 years of trying to control Iran against the wishes of its people. 
Prior to 1953, many Iranians viewed the US as a neutral arbiter between its historic foes 
Britain and Russia (then USSR). In 1946, following the Soviet refusal to end its 
occupation of northern Iran (conducted jointly with Britain during World War II to unseat 
a pro-German Shah and facilitate the transport of Lend-Lease supplies to the USSR), the 
US condemned the Soviets and demanded an immediate withdrawal. Despite being a 
symbolic move, and the fact that the US was motivated more by the need to secure oil 
supplies for post-war reconstruction than benevolence, the action earned the goodwill of 
many Iranians.130 After that, the US adopted a more heavy-handed approach toward Iran, 
one which inevitably backfired.  
What followed was a systematic squandering of the goodwill of the Iranian 
people. The first and most pivotal action  in this regard came in 1953, when the US and 
Britain launched a coup and toppled Iran’s first democratically elected Prime Minister 
Muhammad Mossadeq. After negotiations with the Anglo-Iraqi Oil Company failed to 
bring better terms for Iran, Mossadeq moved towards nationalization. Refusing to 
compromise, Britain approached the US with the idea of organizing a coup. In order to 
bring in the US, Britain played on US fears of communism, and emphasized how 
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Mossadeq allowed the communist Tudeh Party to operate freely. C.M. Woodhouse, the 
leader of the Iran operation, explained the strategy as follows:  
Not wishing to be accused of trying to use the Americans to pull British chestnuts 
out of the fire, I decided to emphasize the Communist threat to Iran rather than the 
need to recover control of the oil industry. I argued that even if a settlement of the 
oil dispute could be negotiated with Musaddiq, which was doubtful, he was still 
incapable of resisting a coup by the [communist] Tudeh Party, if it were backed 
by Soviet support. Therefore he must be removed.131 
 
What followed was named Operation Ajax. Armed with suitcases full of cash, CIA and 
MI6 agents solicited the services of the criminal underworld and elements of the Shia 
clergy to create chaos in the streets, enabling a cabal led by General Fazlollah Zahedi to 
launch a coup and reinstall the Shah.  
The next 26 years of the Shah’s reign were mired by repression, torture, economic 
crises, and poverty. Through his quest to turn Iran into a regional superpower, his 
insatiable appetite for western arms, and over-the-top extravagance, the Shah ruined the 
Iranian economy, leaving most Iranians in poverty. As Egyptian first lady Jehan Sadat 
remarked to Anwar Sadat, “There will be a revolution. I can feel it. The rich here are too 
rich and the poor too poor without enough of a middle class to provide stability.”132 
When discontent arose, the Shah resorted to the heavy handed tactics of SAVAK, his 
CIA-trained secret police, notorious for its use of torture, including techniques such as 
“whipping and beating, electric shocks, the extraction of nails and teeth, boiling water 
pumped into the rectum, heavy weights hung on the testicles, tying the prisoner to a metal 
table heated to white heat, inserting a broken bottle into the anus, and rape.”133 This led 
Amnesty International secretary general Martin Ennals to comment that “no country in 
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the world has a worse record in human rights than Iran.”134 Thus, it should have been no 
surprise that the Iranian Revolution was so single-minded in eliminating US influence 
and charting an independent course for Iran.  
 The Iranian Revolution was seen by the Iraqi leadership as an existential threat. 
The Ba’ath leadership believed that if the Iranian Revolution was left unchecked, it could 
spread, and take root among Iraq’s Shia majority. In its ongoing territorial disputes with 
the Shah, the Iraqi state viewed the Shia clergy as a potential pro-Iranian subversive 
element, and thus tried to co-opt it into supporting the state. In 1969, when President 
Bakr attempted to persuade senior Shia authority Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim to 
condemn Iran over the ongoing Shatt al-Arab dispute, the Ayatollah refused. With the 
Shia clergy refusing to follow the dictates of the state, the state undertook several 
measures to silence the Shia community, such as expelling tens of thousands of “Iranian” 
religious students (many of whom were not Iranian), closing down Kufa University and 
confiscating its endowments, confiscation of property, and spreading rumors accusing 
Hakim’s son of being an Israeli agent. These activities continued throughout the 1970s. 
Recitation of the Quran on television and public religious processions were banned, 
religious schools in the south were shut down, and several religious leaders were 
executed by the state.135 These measures failed to pacify the Shia clergy, and instead 
provided the impetus for greater organization and violent resistance. When Ayatollah 
Hakim’s successor Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr published a manuscript in defense of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran, Iraqi security services arrested him and his sister. Sadr was 
forced to witness the torture and execution of his sister, before he met the same fate. Such 
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gruesome measures only led to further escalation. In 1980, Sadr’s Dawa Party struck 
back with a series of bombings and assassinations against state targets and officials, 
including a failed attempt to kill Deputy Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz at Baghdad 
University, which led to the deaths of several students.  
 Just as the Iranian Revolution represented a threat, it also represented another 
stepping stone for Iraq’s ascendancy to the leadership of the Arab world. After the Arab 
defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt’s uncontested power began to diminish. With 
Anwar Sadat’s pursuit of peace with Israel, culminating in the 1979 Camp David accords, 
Egypt was ostracized by the Arab world, and expelled from the Arab League. With 
Egypt’s fall from grace, Iraq moved to fill the vacuum.  
 For Saddam, the Iranian Revolution and Camp David presented him with the 
opportunity to take the final step to establish his uncontested power. After over a decade 
of filling the ministries under his control with loyalists and cronies, Saddam was already 
the de facto leader of Iraq. Officially, however, Bakr was still president. Despite 
Saddam’s growing power, and despite Bakr’s reluctance to grant carte blanche to 
Saddam, Bakr still restrained Saddam on the rare occasion. Now, in the face of a growing 
Iranian threat, Bakr was seen as a liability. On 16 July 1979, Bakr resigned, citing health 
reasons, leaving Saddam to assume the presidency. In order to cement the transition, 
Saddam turned to his favorite tactic and  launched a purge. Six days later, Saddam 
convened an assembly of Ba’ath Party leaders, announcing the discovery of a Syrian plot. 
In a very emotional display, alternating from puffing on a cigar to wiping tears from his 
eyes, Saddam read off a list of 68 Ba’ath Party members implicated in the plot. As the 
individual names were read off, plainclothes security officers arrived to drag each 
53 
individual from the auditorium. Those left in the assembly were whipped up into a 
frenzy, shouting slogans of support for Saddam. The whole affair was filmed, with 
Saddam distributing tapes of the proceedings throughout the party. The unlucky 68 were 
executed. To top off this grizzly affair, Saddam ordered some of the Ba’ath Party cadre to 
carry out the executions.136  
 Saddam was now the uncontested leader of Iraq. With no internal obstacles in the 
way, Saddam took the next, fatal step to claim the leadership of the Arab world, and set 
his sights on Iran. Fully aware of the fear harbored by most Arab states, especially among 
the Gulf Arab states of the spread of the revolution, Saddam hoped that the Arab world 
would rally behind Iraq in a war against the Persian menace. Furthermore, by launching a 
war, he hoped to settle a territorial dispute. Saddam believed that the demarcation of the 
Shatt al-Arab waterway under the 1975 Algiers Accords was unjust. Saddam took it 
further, and spoke of the need to liberate Khuzistan, the oil-rich southwestern Iranian 
province inhabited by an ethnic Arab population. With Iran still in chaos, cut off from 
American arms, and with the military in disarray following large-scale purges, Saddam 
believed that a war with Iran would lead to a swift victory. As tensions escalated, a final 
meeting was organized between Saddam and the Iranian foreign minister. Salah Omar al-
Ali, Iraqi ambassador to the UN, hoped that war could be averted. As Ali recalled:  
When the meeting finished, Saddam asked me about my own impression. I said 
‘Mr. President, the war is not a joke, we will lose everything, and there is not any 
guarantee that we will win the war. The situation now, the problem [is] under 
your hand.’ And then he didn’t say anything. He kept silent about two or three 
minutes. And then he started to talk to me. He said: “Look Salah, prepare yourself 
and the United Nations. We will resume the war.137  
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Soon after, Saddam tore up the Algiers accords. On 22 September 1980, Iraq took the 
fatal leap, and invaded Iran.  
 The Iran-Iraq War marked a turning point in US-Iraq relations, one which would 
see the closest period of US support thus far. Acknowledging a convergence of interests, 
many US officials, including National Security Advisor under President Jimmy Carter, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, advocated for embracing Iraq as a counterweight to Iran.138 
Similarly, Richard Murphy recalled:  
The implacability of the hatred that the Ayatollah expressed toward western 
interests and particularly towards the United States, we were not hearing that from 
Saddam, and on the contrary what we were hearing was a universal Arab voice 
saying “support this leader.”139 
 
With the fall of the Shah, the US doubled down in an effort to defend its tenuous position 
in the Persian Gulf. In January 1980, President Carter used his State of the Union address 
to establish the Carter Doctrine, declaring the Persian Gulf an area of “vital interest” for 
the US, and that any threat to these interests would be met by any and all means, 
including military force.140 The 1973-74 OPEC embargo and Iranian Revolution both 
revealed how tenuous the US position was in the Gulf. Of course, the perceived threat of 
Soviet forays into the Gulf, regardless of its merit or lack thereof, was one consideration, 
but the top consideration was the emergence of a deeply anti-American Iranian 
government with the potential to close the Strait of Hormuz. Thus, the Iran-Iraq War was 
welcomed by the US, even tacitly encouraged. According to Brzezinski aide Gary Sick:  
Brzezinski was letting Saddam assume that there was a U.S. green light for his 
invasion of Iran, because there was no explicit red light. But to say the U.S. 
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planned and plotted in advance is simply not true. Saddam had his own reasons 
for invading Iran, and they were sufficient.141 
 
With the Carter administration on its way out, the task of forming a more concrete Iraq 
policy fell on the next administration.  
 Up to 1981, events in the war unfolded in Iraq’s favor. Since the start of the war, 
the Iranian cities of Khorramshahr, Mehran, Ahvaz, Susangerd, and the surrounding areas 
fell to Iraqi forces. Iran’s disorganized military failed to stem the Iraqi onslaught. With 
the war going in Iraq’s favor, with its military amply supplied by the USSR and France, 
and with its foreign reserves largely intact, US assistance was not necessary at this point. 
However, the Reagan administration understood that this could change at any moment, 
and if it did, the US should be in a position to prevent an Iraqi defeat. “We now have a 
greater convergence of interests with Iraq than at any time since the revolution since 
1958,” wrote Middle East expert William Eagleton in a State Department telegram, 
adding “on Iran our views largely converge.”142 
 That same year, the US began sending out diplomatic feelers to Iraq. Although the 
US engaged diplomatically with Iraq, albeit indirectly and unofficially, and US 
companies did business in Iraq, both countries had not enjoyed formal relations since 
1967. Complicating matters further was the 1979 decision to list Iraq on the list of state 
sponsors of terrorism for its support for organizations such as the Abu Nidal group. In the 
wake of Yasser Arafat’s peace overtures towards Israel, most famously his 1974 speech 
at the UN, Abu Nidal and hundreds of followers broke off from the PLO and joined the 
Palestinian “rejectionist” camp, vowing to continue the armed struggle. Unlike the PLO, 
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Abu Nidal’s tactics centered almost exclusively around terrorism, opting to attack Israeli 
and dissident targets around the world, while making next to no contributions on the 
battlefield. Seeking influence in the rejectionist camp, and to use the group as a covert 
proxy, Iraq allowed Abu Nidal to move his headquarters to Baghdad.143 Despite these 
obstacles, the Reagan administration launched the first step of a rapprochement between 
the two governments. In October 1981, detailing his correspondence with Iraqi Foreign 
Minister Saadoun Hammadi, Secretary of State Alexander Haig wrote that “the United 
States considers Iraq an important country, which had been carrying out an ambitious 
economic development program and which has the capacity to influence major trends in 
the region.”144 As would be demonstrated later, America’s interest in Iraq’s “economic 
development program” would be to secure business for US companies, and the “major 
trend” that concerned the US the most was the outcome of the war. Shortly after, Haig 
received a warm response from Saadoun.145  
 The Haig-Saadoun correspondence was soon followed by a series of meetings 
between US and Iraqi officials. During the first meeting Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Near Eastern Affairs Morris Draper led a US delegation to Baghdad to meet with an Iraqi 
Foreign Ministry delegation led by Muhammad al-Sahhaf. Draper reiterated Haig’s 
statements about the US recognizing Iraq’s ability to influence major regional trends in 
the region. A State Department telegram paraphrased Sahhaf as having said “a formal 
resumption in diplomatic relations would not be possible until the U.S. altered its basic 
Middle East policies”, especially its policy toward the Palestine-Israel conflict. Despite 
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these outstanding differences, Sahhaf expressed a desire to engage in further talks on a 
resumption of relations.146 In the next meeting, Draper led a US delegation to meet 
intelligence chief Zuhair al-Omar. According to Draper, the meeting “also provided an 
opportunity for me to make a strong pitch for the U.S. company bidding on the metro 
project.”147 The next meeting proved to be the most important, when US officials met 
with Tariq Aziz, head of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). This marked the 
highest-level meeting between US and Iraqi officials since the break in relations in 1967. 
Thus, according to Eagleton, “with the opening of this contact, we are in a position to 
directly communicate with the leadership should we have any sensitive or particularly 
important message to convey.”148 
 Amid these meetings, US-Iraq relations had yet to be formally resumed. Thus far, 
US support for Iraq in the war effort had been confined to limited intelligence sharing on 
a non-attributable basis. In late 1981, President Ronald Reagan signed a secret finding, 
authorizing the CIA to pass along intelligence to Iraq, using Jordan and Saudi Arabia as 
intermediaries.149 However, this was soon to change, and US assistance to Iraq would 
increase. In the latter half of 1981, the Iraqi offensive stalled. The swift and easy victory 
that Saddam counted on was not to be. Saddam woefully underestimated the ability of 
Iran to reorganize and mount a defense. Kenneth Timmerman wrote that “instead of 
toppling that regime, the Iraqi invasion propped it up. Even the pro-monarchists in the 
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Iranian air force closed ranks in defense of their homeland.”150 By 1982, Iranian forces 
had managed to expel Iraqi forces from most of the territory they had occupied. In the 
process, over 40,000 Iraqi troops had fallen into Iranian hands as prisoners of war.151 In 
response, Saddam offered a ceasefire. The Iranian leadership debated what to do next. 
David Crist detailed the debate that followed:  
A divided Iranian leadership debated its next steps in the war. No one advocated 
accepting the ceasefire suddenly offered by Saddam Hussein. Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s son Ahmed Khomeini, as well as the chief of staff of the army, 
pressed for an aggressive offensive to take Basra, overthrow Saddam Hussein, 
and establish an Islamic state within Iraq. But president and future supreme leader 
Seyed Ali Khamenei, foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati, and the pragmatic 
speaker of the parliament Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, were less sanguine 
about invading proper. They argued for seeking punitive reparations and ending 
Saddam Hussein’s ability to threaten the revolution. The chief of the general staff, 
General Zahir Nejad, opposed the invasion because he feared that the 
international community would see Iran as the antagonist and not the victim of 
aggression. Ayatollah Khomeini lay somewhere in between the two views. He 
deeply wanted to overthrow the Baathist regime and spread the Islamic 
Revolution, but he shared General Nejad’s concerns about Iran being perceived as 
the aggressor. The supreme leader preferred to achieve Saddam Hussein’s ouster 
without an invasion of Iraq.152 
 
Ultimately, Khomeini was swayed into continuing the war. “The road to Jerusalem lay 
through Karbala”, Khomeini declared, spurred on by chants of “War! War until 
victory!”.153 Iranian forces pushed into Iraq, reaching the outskirts of Basra by summer of 
1982.  
 Even before the Iranians decided to push into Iraq, the rout of Iraqi forces alarmed 
Washington. Already, Iraq had made requests via Saudi Arabia and Jordan for further US 
assistance.154 Several Arab leaders, including Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, warned of the 
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catastrophic consequences of an Iraqi defeat.155 Anticipating the need to provide Iraq 
with greater assistance in the war, the Reagan administration removed Iraq from the list 
of state sponsors of terrorism.156 Once Iranian forces crossed the border into Iraq, and 
reached  the outskirts of Basra, the Reagan administration decided to expand its 
intelligence sharing operation. US satellites identified several weak points along the Iraqi 
defense lines. Similarly, Iranians had identified the weak points, and amassed their forces 
to strike. According to National Security Council advisor for Near East affairs Howard 
Teicher:  
The strategic Baghdad-Basra road appeared to be the target. If the Iranians could 
cut the road, many analysts concluded, Iraqi forces along the front could be 
routed, bringing about the collapse of Iraq and the victory of Iran. In such 
circumstances, Iranian forces could march on Baghdad, intent on eliminating 
Saddam Hussein and imposing a fundamentalist regime answerable to Iran.157 
 
Using Saudi Arabia and Jordan as intermediaries, the US offered to transmit this 
intelligence to Iraq. However, this time, the offer was taken a step further. The US 
offered to dispatch an intelligence officer to Baghdad to brief the Iraqis of the 
vulnerabilities in their defensive positions. The Iraqis accepted the full package, and soon 
after, received a US briefing, complete with satellite images and maps, recommending 
adjustments to the Iraqi defenses. Several weeks later, when the Iranian offensive 
commenced, the Iraqis successfully fought off the Iranians, imposing heavy casualties.158  
 As US support for Iraq grew, US policymakers began to debate the increasingly 
farcical policy of neutrality in the war. According to a 1984 Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee report: “Since 1982, when the Iraqis agreed to negotiate without conditions, 
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United States policy has tilted toward Iraq. The United States has taken a number of steps 
to shore up Iraq and forestall an Iranian victory.”159 According to Philip Wilcox, a State 
Department liaison to the CIA:  
We did indeed tilt toward Iraq. We provided Iraq with intelligence, took Baghdad 
off the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and viewed positively comments from 
Saddam Hussein suggesting that he supported an Arab-Israeli peace process. 
Many began to view Iraq optimistically as a potential factor for stability and 
Saddam Hussein as a man with whom we could work.160 
 
One of the most revealing sources on the growing US tilt toward Iraq is a State 
Department memorandum from October 1983. According to the document, two issues 
called into question “whether this policy [of neutrality] continues to best serve our 
objectives.” The two changes were “the Iranian strategy of bringing about the Iraqi 
regime’s political collapse through military attrition coupled with financial strangulation 
seems to be slowly having an effect.” In order to alleviate Iraq’s economic woes, the US 
encouraged Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar) to persuade Iran’s ally Syria to reopen a pipeline running from 
Iraq, as well as authorized US firms to assist in the construction of an Iraqi pipeline 
running through Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea. In effect, the document concluded: “Our 
policy of strict neutrality has already been modified, except for arms sales, since Iran’s 
forces crossed into Iraq in the summer of 1982. The steps we have taken toward the 
conflict since then have progressively favored Iraq.”161  
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 As Iraq’s economy teetered, the US provided economic aid which allowed Iraq to 
sustain its war effort. Due to the war, Iraq’s ability to produce and export oil had fallen 
precipitously. In 1982, Iran’s ally Syria closed the Banias pipeline, while the Iranian Air 
Force bombed the oil terminal at Fao. Iraqi oil revenues fell from $26 billion in 1980 to 
$9 billion in 1982. Falling oil revenues, coupled with war expenditures, led to a drop in 
foreign reserves from $30 billion in 1980 to $3 billion in 1983. To cover the deficit, Iraq 
increasingly turned to foreign loans, especially from the Gulf Arab states. By April 1983, 
Iraq’s foreign debt stood at $25 billion.162 Facing their own financial woes amidst low 
global oil prices, Iraq’s Gulf Arab creditors proved reluctant and unwilling to provide 
further assistance. Without a source of additional funds, the ability of Iraq to sustain the 
war effort was in jeopardy. Thus far, Saddam had managed to ensure public support, or at 
least acquiescence to the war, by pursuing a policy of “guns and butter.”163 With the 
amenities of everyday life still available in abundance, most Iraqis, with the exception of 
frontline cities such as Basra, and the occasional Iranian air raid as far as Baghdad, 
quality of life had remained largely unaffected. With Iraq’s dire economic predicament, 
this was bound to change. To alleviate the situation, the US extended a line of credit via 
the Commodities Credit Corporation (CCC). Under the CCC, the US government 
encourages private banks to offer loans to foreign states and companies to buy vital 
commodities such as food. In order to incentivize private banks to give loans, the US 
government acts as a guarantor against default. Should a recipient default, the US 
government steps in to pay the banks, while the recipient must then make payments to the 
US government. According to Kenneth Timmerman: “This is how the U.S. government 
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came to Saddam’s rescue. U.S. food credits and government-backed loans allowed 
Saddam to devote his remaining cash resources to the war against Iran.”164  
 The tilt toward Iraq became more evident as US officials suggested an 
increasingly accommodating stance towards Iraq’s demand for arms and technology. 
Although Iraq had successfully thwarted the Iranian offensive at Basra, Iranian forces 
remained deeply entrenched on the outskirts of the city, poised to renew offensive 
operations. In order to assist Iraq in bringing about an Iranian rollback, Ambassador 
Eagleton suggested “we can selectively lift restrictions on third-party transfers of U.S.-
licensed military equipment to Iraq [...] we go ahead and do it through Egypt.”165 
According to NSC advisor Teicher, Iraq received arms from Egypt via a US program 
known as “Bear Spares.” Under the Bear Spares program, “the United States made sure 
that spare parts and ammunition for Soviet or Soviet-style weaponry were available to 
countries which sought to reduce their dependence on the Soviets for defense needs.”166 
Egypt, replacing its arsenal with American weaponry after Sadat’s reorientation toward 
the West, readily transferred much of its Soviet-manufactured surplus to Iraq. According 
to Teicher, the US engaged in other third-party transfer agreements with suppliers of non-
Soviet arms, including the supplying of cluster bombs from Chilean arms dealer Carlos 
Cardoen.167  
 Iraq would use its western assistance to attempt a breakthrough on the battlefield. 
In February 1983, amid an impending Iranian offensive, the Iraqis issued a threat: “The 
invaders should know that for every harmful insect there is an insecticide capable of 
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annihilating it whatever their number and that Iraq possesses this annihilation 
insecticide.”168 One of the earliest recorded cases of Iraqi chemical weapons use occured 
on 9 August, when Iraqi planes dropped chemical munitions in northwestern Iran, 
injuring over 50 Iranian combatants. This was followed in October when Iraqi artillery 
units fired at least 20 chemical munitions at Iranian forces north of Panjwin, in northeast 
Iraq.169 By November, the State Department reported “what appears to be Iraq’s almost 
daily use of CW.”170 US reaction, as much of the world’s reaction, was remarkably 
muted. In fact, one State Department telegram attempted to deflect criticism and portray 
Iran as the guilty party:  
While condemning Iraq’s resort to chemical weapons, the United States also calls 
on the Government of Iran to accept the good offices provided by a number of 
countries and international organizations to put an end to the bloodshed. The 
United States finds the present Iranian regime’s intransigent refusal to deviate 
from its avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government of 
neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among 
nations and the moral and religious basis which it claims.171 
 
The muted US response was not without cause. Calling attention to Iraqi chemical 
weapons use might have also brought attention to the role that US companies and those 
of America’s western allies played in assisting the development of the Iraqi chemical 
weapons program, making for an embarrassing political scandal. In November 1983, the 
State Department noted that “we also know that Iraq has acquired a CW production 
capacity, primarily from Western firms, including possibly a U.S. foreign subsidiary.”172 
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According to the 1992 Riegle Report by the US Senate, the US provided extensive 
assistance, not just with chemical weapons, but biological weapons and ballistic missiles:  
The United States provided the Government of Iraq with “dual use” licensed 
materials which assisted in the development of Iraqi chemical, biological, and 
missile-system programs, including: chemical warfare agent precursors; chemical 
warfare agent production facility plans and technical drawings (provided as 
pesticide production facility plans); chemical warhead filling equipment; 
biological warfare related materials; missile fabrication equipment; and missile-
system guidance equipment.173 
 
Despite these developments, and continued Iraqi use of chemical weapons, US-
Iraq relations continued to develop without impediment. Once more the US reiterated that 
it “would regard any major reversal of Iraq’s forces as a strategic defeat for the west.”174 
In December, the US proceeded with two high-level meetings with the highest levels of 
the Iraqi state thus far. In the first meeting, Reagan presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld 
met with Tariq Aziz, where both sides expressed their common interests: “Peace in the 
Gulf. Keeping Syria and Iran off balance and less influential. And promoting Egypt’s 
reintegration in the Arab world.”175 In the next meeting, Rumsfeld met with Saddam 
Hussein. Rumsfeld wrote that as an independent and non-aligned state, “it was incorrect 
and unbalanced to have relations with the Soviet Union and not the US.” Rumsfeld also 
conveyed Iraq’s interest in accepting US assistance to construct oil pipelines to 
circumvent the Persian Gulf.176  
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Closer diplomatic relations paved the way for a deepening in economic relations. 
Despite the costs of the war, Saddam remained determined to continue his development 
program. In 1984, according to a State Department memorandum, Iraq had entered into 
agreements or was in the process of implementing existing agreements with the following 
US companies: Westinghouse, General Electric, Bechtel, Halliburton, Deleuw Cather, 
Midland International, Howe-Baker Engineers, NCR, Combustion Engineering, Bell 
Helicopter, and Lockheed. The list of projects included: power plants, the Baghdad 
Metro, the Iraq-Jordan pipeline, oil field equipment, a linear alkyl benzene plant, a 
turnkey ammonium storage plant, an antibiotics plant, and civilian ambulance 
helicopters.177 In December 1983, Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Richard 
Murphy suggested that the US Export-Import (Exim) Bank provide loans to support Iraqi 
infrastructure projects.178  
Some of these contracts, such as the ammonium plant and antibiotic plant, should 
have aroused concerns over exporting dual-use technology, yet no scrutiny was 
forthcoming. For example, when asked by the House Foreign Affairs Committee if the 
sale of 2,000 five-ton trucks to Iraq were for military use, a US official stated “we 
presumed this was Iraq’s intention, and had not asked.”179 Increasingly, the policy of 
dual-use exports to Iraq was to ask no questions.  
Most alarming, the policy of asking no questions applied to the export of nuclear 
technology as well. In May of 1984, the US launched a policy review for the sale of 
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technology to Iraqi nuclear entities. The logic went as follows: “once the door was 
opened to dual-use items being approved to non-nuclear Iraqi entities, it makes no sense 
to deny them to nuclear entities.”180 The fact that Iraq had nuclear weapons aspirations 
was well-known to the US government. In June 1983, the CIA published a National 
Intelligence Estimate, which how “Saddam Husayn appealed for international assistance 
to help the Arabs acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent to Israel.” In pursuit of this goal, 
Iraq sought the cooperation of the USSR to develop a research and development program, 
French assistance to construct the Osirak reactors at Tuwaitha, and lab technology from 
Italy to develop the complete fuel cycle for extracting plutonium. Despite setbacks, most 
notably the 1981 Israeli airstrike at the Tuwaitha site, Iraq remained determined to 
develop a nuclear weapon.181 These warnings went unheeded, and US exports to Iraqi 
nuclear firms continued. Years later, in the course of the UNSCOM disarmament of Iraq, 
a UN arms inspector reported that US technology was found at Iraqi nuclear sites.182 
For the US, dual-use exports of nuclear technology were not done for the sake of 
assisting Iraq acquire a nuclear weapon, but to secure business for US firms in spite of 
Iraq’s nuclear ambitions. Nuclear weapons were in any case, for all sides concerned, a 
long-term ambition. The more immediate concern was to alter the course of the war. With 
the failure of either side to achieve any territorial gains, and the prospects of any 
breakthrough unlikely any time soon, the war began to move into a phase of attrition. In 
1984, Iraq spread the war into the Persian Gulf. Armed with French Exocet missiles, the 
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Iraqi Air Force began striking at Iranian ships, especially oil tankers. Iran responded in 
kind by attacking Iraqi ships, as well as those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, who were 
financing the Iraq war effort and ferrying supplies for Iraq. 183 Not to mention, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE allowed Iraqi planes to refuel at their airfields.184 In turn, both sides 
declared naval exclusion zones, where unauthorized ships were subjected to measures 
from inspection to sinking. Additionally, Iran took to laying mines in the Gulf, including 
next to the Iraqi port of Um Qasr, effectively halting shipping through the port.185 The 
tanker war was born.  
Saddam hoped that by taking the war into a body of water so vital to the oil trade, 
he could “internationalize the war.”186 In other words, Saddam hoped to draw the 
international community into the war in order to help end it, desirably in Iraq’s favor. 
Saddam had ample reason to believe the international community would take the side of 
Iraq. When the UN Security Council passed Resolution 552, attacks on Saudi and 
Kuwaiti shipping were condemned, while attacks on Iranian shipping went unmentioned, 
implying that Iran was responsible for the tanker war.187 Saddam’s move was successful 
enough to ensure greater US aid, and set in motion a chain of events which increasingly 
drew the US military into the Gulf. In April 1984, the White House issued NSDD 139, in 
order “to deter an expansion of the conflict in the Persian Gulf.” Additionally, it called 
for “consultations with the key Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Bahrein 
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[sic]”, and for a US effort to “prepare a plan of action designed to avert an Iraqi 
collapse.”188  
To reinforce this policy, the US launched Operation Staunch, an arms embargo 
aimed at deterring foreign arms dealers from selling to Iran. According to Kenneth 
Timmerman, “by 1984, as Operation Staunch frightened many potential suppliers away 
from selling weapons and spare parts to Iran, Baghdad became the favorite watering hole 
for the world’s arms salesmen.”189 While Iran was being strangled, Iraq engaged in a 
flurry of activity to diversify its conventional arsenal, and to further develop its WMD 
capability. For the bulk of its conventional arsenal, Iraq deepened its ties to the USSR 
and France. For armored vehicles, Iraq turned to Brazil. For cluster bombs, it turned to 
Chile. To modify the Soviet-made SCUD missile and extend its effective range, Iraq 
joined Argentina and Egypt to launch the Condor program. For chemical weapons 
precursors, Iraq continued purchasing materials from western countries, including the 
US, where a consignment of 74 drums of potassium fluoride were discovered by US 
Customs at Kennedy Airport in New York, destined for the State Enterprise for Pesticide 
Production in Baghdad.190 Under license from the US Department of Commerce, Iraq 
received biological samples, including anthrax and botulinum, from US firms, including 
59 shipments from American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) alone.191 
Heading into 1985, a new force emerged in the US, pushing for closer relations 
with Iraq. As trade increased, a new lobby coalesced around Marshall Wiley. A career 
diplomat with extensive experience in the Middle East, including in Iraq, Wiley brought 
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together some of the biggest companies in the US to form the US-Iraq Business Forum. 
According to Wiley:  
The Iraqis were not at ease with working with the U.S. private sector because 
their experience until then had been primarily with the central planning structures 
of Eastern Europe. So I thought we needed an organization to get to know each 
other better. That’s how I got the idea for the Forum.192 
 
The Forum rallied some of the biggest names in the US business behind it, including 
Amoco, Exxon, Hunt Oil, Occidental, Texaco, AT&T, Bechtel, Brown and Root, 
Caterpillar, General Motors, Comet Rice, Bell Textron, and Lockheed, among others. 
Through a concerted lobbying effort, as well as connections to Reagan administration 
insiders such as former Bechtel executive-turned Secretary of State George Shultz.193 
 With support from the business community, Reagan opened the door for high-
technology exports to Iraq. Soon afterwards, dozens of US high-technology firms flocked 
to a March 1985 trade fair in Baghdad. Some companies, such as Hewlett-Packard, 
followed up by opening offices in Baghdad.194 At last, Iraq gained access to the 
technology needed to advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Once more, 
the US acted largely with disinterest to possible dual-use and diversion issues. According 
to General Accounting Office report, in 1986, 16 high-technology export licenses were 
issued to US firms engaged with the Saad 16 complex, despite knowledge that the site 
was engaged in ballistic missile development.195 
 The increase in US support came at an opportune moment. In February 1986, 
Iranian forces launched an amphibious assault across the Shatt al-Arab, capturing Fao. 
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With the capture of Fao, Iraq’s sole oil terminus in the Gulf was cut off. Further Iranian 
advances aimed at Basra and Um Qasr were thwarted, while Iraqi counter-attacks at Fao 
were also thwarted.196 Once more, Iraq resorted to using chemical weapons. Reports of 
hundreds and thousands dying in the most excruciating manner possible, of battlefields 
littered with expended atropine needles, and an Iranian effort to send victims to capitals 
in the developed world for treatment, were met largely with silence. The US was no 
different, focusing instead on keeping Iraqi oil and US exports flowing.  
 In 1986, Saddam’s effort to internationalize the war in the Gulf began to bear 
fruit. On 12 January, the American commercial ship President Taylor was interdicted by 
Iranian Navy vessels in the Iranian exclusion zone. Despite protests from the ship 
captain, he relented and allowed Iranian sailors to inspect the ship for war materiel and 
contraband. After Iranian sailors had verified there was no contraband onboard, the vessel 
was allowed to resume its course unmolested. The US responded with a State Department 
letter sent via the Swiss embassy in Tehran, containing a thinly veiled threat: 
“Irrespective of the legal issues involved, the visit and search of U.S. flag vessels by 
Iranian armed forces during a period of heightened tensions and regional conflict could 
lead to a confrontation between U.S. and Iranian military units, which neither nation 
desires.”197  
Following this incident, the US adopted a policy which made clear that all 
measures, including military force, would be used to prevent Iranian forces from 
boarding US ships. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger advocated for sending the 
US Navy to escort US civilian vessels. If Iranian forces attempted an interdiction on 
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suspicion of contraband, the US Navy would divert the vessel to a neutral port, conduct 
an inspection, and report the results to Iranian forces. National Security Advisor John 
Poindexter concurred, stating that if Iranian forces continued in their efforts to board US 
ships, the “on-scene commander will use whatever means may be appropriate, including 
measured military force, to forestall any such attempt.”198 
Although a rigorous US response to Iranian actions and ambivalence to Iraqi 
actions was yet further evidence of a US tilt towards Iraq, new developments in October 
and November 1986 shed light on the true nature of this relationship. The relationship 
was always an uneasy one. As Said Aburish explained, “it wasn’t a friend, Iraq was not a 
friend. There was no trust. And it wasn’t an enemy, wasn’t a foe.”199 In other words, 
although the US tilted toward Iraq, it did not view Iraq as an ally in the traditional sense 
of the word, but rather an ally of immediate necessity. As cynical and calculating as 
Saddam was, as the war dragged on, he became ever more weary of the intentions of the 
US, suspecting it of engaging in double dealing. According to Aburish, who was one of 
Saddam’s advisors at the time, “Saddam Hussein made it very plain to me that if the 
United States wanted the war to stop, they would stop it.”200  
Saddam had ample reason to suspect American duplicity. Although the US clearly 
wanted to prevent an Iranian victory in the war, the prospect of an Iraqi victory was also 
unappealing. “There was no great love for Saddam Hussein. Neither side was a good guy. 
It’s a pity the war could not have lasted forever,” remarked Richard Armitage, who 
served as Assistant Secretary of Defense under the Reagan administration.201 In October, 
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in the most unlikeliest of places, Saddam’s suspicions began to appear true. In Nicaragua, 
a CIA pilot shipping arms for the Contras named Eugene Hasenfus was shot down and 
captured alive by the Sandinistas.202 Despite being barred by the Boland Amendment 
from supporting the Contras, and despite Congress cutting off funds, the Reagan 
administration remained committed to keep the secret war going. What remained unclear 
was how the administration was able to continue funding the Contras. In November, the 
Lebanese newspaper al-Shiraa published an expose, revealing that the Reagan 
administration funded the Contra war by diverting proceeds from illegal arms sales to 
Iran to the Contras. Arms sales to Iran were originally devised to act as a ransom 
payment in return for Iran putting pressure on pro-Iranian Lebanese militias to release 
American hostages kidnapped amid the Lebanese civil war. This policy of killing two 
birds with one stone came to be known as the Iran-Contra scandal.  
In the course of the Iran-Contra scandal, Iran purchased hundreds of Hawk and 
TOW missiles, and spare parts, which enabled Iran to continue fighting a state which the 
US was actively supporting. In the course of these secret dealings, Iran sent a request for 
US military intelligence on Iraq via arms dealer and intermediary Manucher Ghorbanifar. 
In order to keep the secret channel open, the US obliged. Simultaneously not wanting to 
provide Iran with a decisive advantage, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Robert 
Gates advised that any intelligence provided “would give no significant advantage to the 
Iranian military.”203  
Saddam protested American secret dealings and demanded a meeting with US 
officials. The Reagan administration sent Richard Murphy to Baghdad to reassure 
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Saddam that Iran-Contra was a one-time affair aimed at achieving narrow, short-term 
interests. Despite Saddam’s earlier protests, Murphy observed that Saddam’s response to 
the meeting was rather muted. According to Murphy, “It’s curious, but there was never 
was clear, strong, angry protests from Baghdad, and the best interpretation I could ever 
give that reaction was one of cynicism. This is what great nations do. They don’t 
necessarily keep to their word or their stated policy.”204 Ultimately, Iran-Contra served as 
a minor speed bump in US-Iraq relations, and continued as if nothing happened.  
If Iran-Contra was indicative of how far Saddam would go to forgive the US, an 
Iraqi friendly fire incident indicated how far the US was willing to go to forgive Iraq. On 
17 May 1987, an Iraqi fighter jet fired two Exocet missiles at the US frigate USS Stark, 
on patrol near an exclusion zone. The first missile failed to detonate, and the second one 
detonated, tearing a hole through the ship. As a result, 37 US sailors were killed, and 21 
were wounded. Iraq immediately accepted responsibility for the incident, issued an 
immediate apology, reaffirmed the incident was an accident, and presented the US with 
$400 million for a settlement fund.205 US reaction was muted, demonstrating a desire to 
brush the affair off. All that Secretary of State George Shultz had to say was “this event 
underlines once more the seriousness of the tensions that exist in the Middle East, and the 
importance of trying to do something about them.”206 President Reagan attempted to 
deflect blame for the incident, declaring “Iran is the real villain in the piece.”207 
For Iraq, if there was any silver lining to the USS Stark incident, it had the effect 
of drawing the US further into the tanker war. By May 1987,  227 ships had been 
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attacked in the Gulf, 137 of them by Iraq, and 90 by Iran. Additionally, 153 of the ships 
were oil tankers, while 211 merchant seamen had lost their lives.208 The USS Stark 
incident came to the Reagan administration as a warning for urgent action in order to 
bring the tanker war to a close. The next escalation in the tanker war came when Kuwait 
reached out to the US, seeking armed protection for its ships. The US obliged, and 
launched Operation Earnest Will. During this operation, Kuwaiti ships were reflagged 
under the US flag, and were accompanied by US Navy escorts. 
Earnest Will got off to a rough start. On the very first escort mission, a Kuwaiti 
tanker, reflagged as the MV Bridgeton, struck an Iranian mine. Despite damage, the 
Bridgeton continued onwards, while its Navy escorts huddled behind for protection. The 
incident received widespread public attention, and raised doubts as to what the US Navy 
was really doing in the Persian Gulf. Commenting on the incident, Rear Admiral Harold 
Bernsen explained that “it may sound incongruous, but the fact is a large ship, a non-
warship like the Bridgeton, is far less vulnerable to a mine than a warship … if you’ve 
got a big tanker that is very hard to damage with a single mine, you get behind it. That’s 
the best defense and that’s exactly what we did.”209 Middle East correspondent Robert 
Fisk raised a poignant question: “If the US Navy could not protect itself without hiding 
behind a civilian vessel, how could it claim to be maintaining freedom of navigation in 
the Gulf?”210  
Ultimately, Earnest Will proved to be more of a political exercise, aimed at 
placating America’s allies, and to satisfy demands to do something about the tanker war. 
Earnest Will was a stopgap measure aimed at maintaining freedom of navigation, as well 
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as a justification for an increased US naval presence in the Gulf. In order to create a 
lasting solution, and to stifle the tanker war, the US decided that the best way to do so 
was target Iran. Although Iran had not started the tanker war, US strategists nonetheless 
opted to knock Iran out of the fight in the Gulf. Ever since the Iran-Iraq War began, US 
strategists had been developing contingency plans involving direct military action against 
Iran. In 1980, Admiral James “Ace” Lyons formulated a strategy involving a Marine 
invasion of Kharg Island, through which almost all Iranian oil export traveled through. In 
1986, US Central Command (CENTCOM) drew up a contingency plan calling for the 
bombing of Bandar Abbas and the mining of its harbor. In 1987, Lyons devised a plan 
outside the proper military channels, involving the bombing of strategic and economic 
targets on the Iranian coast, between Chah Bahr and Bushehr.211 Earnest Will provided 
political cover for an increased US naval presence, kicking off Operation Nimble Archer. 
During the course of the operation, the US attacked three offshore oil rigs, converted for 
military use.212  
Heading into 1988, with the naval conflict escalating in the Gulf, with Iranian 
resources stretched thin, Iraq renewed a series of offenses along the Iran-Iraq frontline. In 
the first offensive, Saddam authorized northern commander Ali Hassan al-Majid to use 
any and all means, including chemical warfare, to crush the Kurdish rebellion which 
erupted amid the ongoing war and push the Iranians out of Iraqi Kurdistan. Unlike 
previous Kurdish rebellions, the two dominant political parties, the Kurdish Democratic 
Party and Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, usually feuding among 
themselves, had put their hostilities aside, and were working together with Iran to launch 
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a general insurrection. In the process, the KDP and PUK welcomed Iranian forces into 
Kurdistan. To crush the rebellion and expel the Iranians, Iraq launched the al-Anfal 
campaign. During al-Anfal, the Iraqi military launched a genocidal onslaught on the 
Kurdish population, uprooting and destroying entire villages, conducting mass 
executions, and making widespread use of chemical weapons. In the most well-known 
episode of al-Anfal, Iraqi forces unleashed chemical weapons on the town of Halabja, 
killing upwards of 5,000 people.  
Once more, amid the largest use of chemical weapons since World War I, the 
official US reaction, and indeed the international reaction, was largely one of silence. 
According to former CIA analyst Judith Yaphe, “very little of that was made outside of 
Kurdistan, outside of Iraq. Certainly you didn’t see much of it in the American or 
European press.” During a disarmament conference, Swedish diplomat Rolf Ekeus 
recalled that his condemnations of the Halabja massacre were met with “Dead silence. 
Not one in that whole, with that time 38 states conference of disarmament, all major 
weapons countries involved [...] no one lifted a finger.”213 Nor was any state likely to 
condemn the massacre, for fear of exposing their culpability. As Iraqi Foreign Minister 
Tariq Aziz remarked: “If Iraq or Iran or any other state is suddenly in a position to 
produce chemical weapons, the raw materials and facilities were obtained from industrial 
countries. Europe is the main source. For Europe to be outraged and shed crocodile tears 
is pure hypocrisy.”214 In the US, the Reagan administration opposed Congressional 
efforts to sanction Iraq.215 Sanctions were rejected on the grounds that they would 
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“undermine relations and reduce US influence on a country that has emerged from the 
Persian Gulf War as one of the one of the most powerful Arab nations.”216 Instead, Iraq 
was encouraged to continue offensive operations against Iranian positions. Joost 
Hiltermann, director of the International Crisis Group, summarized the US response most 
succinctly: “By any measure, the American record on Halabja is shameful.”217 
After Halabja, Iraq judged that international condemnation for chemical weapons 
use would be symbolic, if not nonexistent, no matter the scale and target. Far from 
condemning Iraq, the US dispatched a team of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
officers to Baghdad to deliver satellite intelligence and targeting arrays. A month after 
Halabja, in April, Iraq launched Operation Blessed Ramadan, with the aim of recapturing 
Fao. Following a massive air force onslaught, using both conventional and chemical 
munitions, Iraqi infantry units stormed and recaptured Fao.218 After the battle, DIA 
officer Rick Francona surveyed the aftermath, and reported witnessing a battlefield 
littered with hundreds of atropine syringes, used to counteract the effects of sarin.219  
Days after the recapture of Fao, the US launched Operation Praying Mantis. After a series 
of mutual escalations, such as the US Navy harassing the Iranian Navy, the Iranians 
ramping up mine-laying activities, and the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts nearly sinking 
after striking four Iranian mines, a day-long naval battle erupted on 14 April. Defense 
Department historian David Crist documented the outcome of the battle as follows:  
The daylong fight had been a disaster for Iran. Although the United States 
lost one helicopter to nonhostile causes, the Iranian military had committed its air 
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and naval forces piecemeal into the Gulf. With its platforms destroyed and unable 
to get any air surveillance over the Gulf, Iran operated in the blind against the 
U.S. Navy. The outcome was never in doubt. 
After Operation Praying Mantis, Iran backed off from engaging the U.S. 
military. Having lost its most capable ships, the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy 
kept its remaining combatants in port for most of the remainder of the Iran-Iraq 
War.220  
 
 Having been expelled from Fao, and pushed back from Basra, the Iranian 
leadership had to debate whether or not to continue the war. With its navy rendered 
largely ineffective, and with the economy collapsing, the Iranian leadership had to weigh 
the uncertain possibility that Iraq would cross the Iranian border once more. For 
Khomeini, the prospect of suing for peace with the hated Saddam was unappealing, nor 
was the prospect of continuing a mutually destructive war with no end in sight. Iran was 
well aware that the US tilted toward Iraq, the naval engagements of 1987-1988 
eliminated any doubts as to where the US stood. Then, on 3 July, the US missile cruiser 
USS Vincennes fired a missile at Iran Air Flight 655, flying over the Persian Gulf en route 
to Dubai. All 290 people on board were killed. The shoot-down was an accident, caused 
by a mixing up of flight tracking numbers, and the negligence and aggressiveness of the 
ship’s commander. The Iranians, however, were convinced that the action was deliberate, 
and that the US was prepared to shoot down more Iranian civilian aircraft to force Iran to 
cease hostilities. Thus, Iran sued for peace, and accepted a ceasefire under UN Resolution 
598. “Woe upon me that I am still alive and have drunk the poisoned chalice of the 
resolution,” lamented Khomeini.221 
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 According to the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), upon conclusion of the 
war, approximately 750,000 Iranians and 500,000 Iraqis lay dead.222 After 8 years, the 
war ended in a stalemate, with both sides having failed in their stated objectives. The 
Iran-Iraq border remained where it was with the start of the war, as did the dividing line 
along the Shatt al-Arab. Iraq failed to annex Khuzestan, and each side failed to uproot the 
leadership of the other side. Far from being able to claim the leadership of the Arab 
world, Iraq accumulated a foreign debt of $100 billion.223 According to the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the vast majority of Iraq’s expenditures 
from 1980 to 1990 were dedicated to arms purchases. During this period, Iraq spent $80 
billion on arms, compared to France ($69.5 billion) and Britain ($68.6 billion).224 Despite 
these massive expenditures, Iraq had little to show for 8 years of war.  
 Nonetheless, Saddam declared victory. To commemorate this so-called victory, 
Saddam ordered the construction of a victory monument, comprised of two hands holding 
a pair of crossed swords. This was followed by a victory parade, with Saddam leading the 
procession through the Victory Arch. Saddam was very appreciative of the US role in 
bringing about this “victory.” As part of its reward, Iraq granted US intelligence officers 
the opportunity to inspect and disassemble some of the latest Soviet weaponry. 
According to David Crist, US Army analysts produced a report of a Soviet artillery piece 
with an unusual caveat: “Secret/Not Releasable to Foreign Countries Except Iraq.” In 
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turn, Saddam named a new division of the Republican Guard “the Tawakalna Division, 
short for Tawakalna Ala Allah, or ‘In God We Trust,’the motto of the United States.”225  
 For the US, the outcome of the war was seen as a success. US assistance had 
helped avert an Iraqi collapse, and helped stem the spread of the Iranian Revolution. Iraq 
had proven its worth to the US, so much so that policymakers began to speak of 
resurrecting Nixon’s Twin Pillars policy. To this effect, the George H.W. Bush 
administration issued National Security Directive (NSD) 26, under the assumption that 
“normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term 
interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and Middle East.” Among its provisions, 
NSD 26 called for “U.S. firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy,” 
for “developing access to and influence with the Iraqi defense establishment” through 
“sales of non-lethal military assistance [...] on a case by case basis.”226 According to NSC 
advisor Teicher:  
This policy was based on the assumption that Iraq and Saudi Arabia would protect 
America’s vital interests in the Gulf. As a result of the tacit alliance between 
Baghdad and Washington against Iran and the growing distance between Baghdad 
and Moscow, NSD 26 directed the national security bureaucracy to strengthen 
Iraq to ensure that it would be a force for regional stability and a deterrent against 
Soviet and Iranian aggression. The tilt was complete.227 
 
 The third phase of US-Iraq relations marked the closest phase between the two 
states. With the onset of the Iran-Iraq War, US support for Iraq reached unprecedented 
heights, replete with carte blanche sales of conventional arms, dual-use exports, WMD 
components, economic aid, and diplomatic cover for Iraq’s most heinous acts. When 
Saddam launched the Iran-Iraq War, the US took no substantive effort to signal 
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disapproval of Iraqi aggression, and instead offered tacit approval. After Iranian forces 
expelled the invaders and pushed into Iraq in 1983, the US stood with Iraq every step of 
the way to sustain the Iraqi war effort and avert an Iraqi collapse, no matter the legality or 
humanitarian consequences. In the short-term, the policy was seen as a resounding 
success. The spread of the Islamic Revolution beyond Iran and the Shia quarters of 
Lebanon, so feared by many, did not come to fruition. Despite the fact that both Iran and 
Iraq were both thoroughly drained after eight years of war and with nothing to show for 
it, it was Iran which sued for peace. As the war continued with no end in sight, partly due 
to US double dealings in the Iran-Contra affair, the US business community stood ready 
to exploit Iraq’s enormous demand for hi-tech goods, agricultural commodities, 
infrastructure development, and post-war reconstruction. For all concerned in the US, it 
was regarded as a win-win scenario. Shortly after the end of the war, the illusory nature 
of this success revealed itself.  
 
Betrayal: Gulf War, Sanctions, Humanitarian Catastrophe, and Regime Change  
 With the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War, fissures began to emerge, showing the 
fragility of the relationship. Despite the passage of NSD 26, and expanding trade 
relations, a countercurrent within the US government began to call for a review of US-
Iraq relations. Absent an Iranian threat, the glue which held the US and Iraq together 
began to dissolve. Despite emerging differences, the Bush administration remained 
committed to deepening the relationship. This commitment remained to the very last day 
before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Ultimately, the commitment to closer relations with 
Iraq dissolved because the US failed to create an effective policy to clean up the mess it 
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helped create. After the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq was left with over half a million dead, 
massive infrastructure damage on its western front, a hollowed economy, tens of billions 
of dollars in debt, and a dispute with Kuwait over stolen oil. With these issues thrust upon 
a megalomaniac dictator, armed with one of the largest land armies in the world, 
equipped with chemical and biological weapons, aspiring for nuclear weapons, and with a 
sense of impunity bestowed upon him by complicit Western governments, these issues 
combined into a toxic mess, one which the US failed to address or take its due share of 
responsibility. Once it became clear that Saddam was beyond control, the US turned on 
its former client by launching the Gulf War, implementing devastating sanctions, and 
sponsoring covert regime change efforts. Once again, growing US efforts to exert power 
over Iraq, this time by force, only led to greater instability and loss of control. In doing 
so, the US laid waste to a society which enjoyed one of the highest standards of living 
and rate of development in the Middle East, producing one of the worst humanitarian 
catastrophes of the late-20th century. When covert operations and sanctions failed to 
unseat Saddam, and with the US determined to accomplish this goal, the next logical step 
was war, which was launched in 2003.  
 One of the first fissures to develop in the relationship emerged in the last day of 
the Iran-Iraq War. After the Halabja massacre, a group of 31 members of Congress put 
forth the Prevention of Genocide Act in the House of Representatives. The act called for 
sanctions against Iraq, prohibiting the US from importing Iraqi oil, providing loans and 
credits, and exporting military equipment to Iraq.228 Immediately, the Iraq lobby launched 
a lobbying effort to kill the act. Marshall Wiley of the US-Iraq Business Forum wrote a 
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letter to President Reagan, lobbying against the bill. As Timmerman detailed, Wiley 
“chose to write his letter on Forum stationery, which listed the organization’s impressive 
roster of Fortune 500 members. It was a none-too-subtle hint of whose interests he was 
defending.”229 US companies did not want to be shut out of the lucrative Iraqi market. In 
agriculture, Iraq ranked the twelfth-largest market for US agriculture exports, with one-
third of its food imports coming from the US.230 By 1988, Iraq also became a major 
supplier of oil to the US, having risen from zero barrels in 1981 to 126 million barrels in 
1988, in effect selling  one out of every four barrels of its oil to the US. Additionally, Iraq 
gave US oil companies preferential treatment, selling oil at $1 per barrel below the price 
European companies were paying.231 Additionally, with Iraq in need of post-war 
reconstruction, US companies were presented with further opportunities for business.  
 The lobbying effort proved successful, and the Reagan administration rejected the 
act, with strategic and commercial interests taking precedence over human rights. 
According to a General Accounting Office (GAO) report, “It seems that the U.S. desire to 
build a strategic and agricultural trade relationship with Iraq outweighed the apparent 
financial risks involved and discounted evidence of Iraq’s human rights violations.”232 
For US companies, this ensured the continuation of trade with Iraq, despite the fact that 
Iraq was rated a “high-risk market,” and was falling behind on loan repayment.233  
 In short, US-Iraq relations continued, business as usual. Iraq was hungry for 
foreign assistance in reconstruction. The US was eager to profit from reconstruction. 
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Likewise, the US was eager to continue supporting Iraq as a means of deterring and 
containing Iran. However, fissures began to emerge in the relationship. First and 
foremost, Iraq was faced with a crippling foreign debt, putting Iraq at odds with 
American allies among the Gulf Arab states. Second, isolated but growing voices within 
the US government began to call for a review of relations with Iraq. Iraq’s numerous 
human rights violations were now to be scrutinized by the US, without acknowledging 
the US role in tolerating and facilitating these violations. Third, Iraq continued 
development of its WMD program, and took the first steps in building a domestic arms 
industry.  
 The period from 1989 to the last day before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is 
marked by contradictions in policy. In 1989, for example, the Bush administration issued 
NSD 26, as detailed earlier. Exports of dual-use technologies continued, in some cases 
even expanded. At the same time, as mentioned earlier, there were several efforts in 
Congress to sanction Iraq, largely in response to the Halabja massacre. Iraq was also 
thrust into the center of the post-Cold War US policy debate. Since the developments of 
1989, from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the Soviet withdrawal of over 500,000 military 
personnel from Eastern Europe, to the collapse of the USSR in 1991, US policymakers 
decided that the end of the Cold War would change nothing. Despite a weakened USSR 
seeking rapprochement with the US, the US military posture and geopolitical strategy 
would remain unchanged. However, given the diminishing power of the USSR, the US 
justification for its military posture was equally diminishing. As Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell put it, “I’m running out of bad guys. I’m down to Kim Il-
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Sung and Castro.”234 During the course of the Bush administration, US strategists began 
formulating a global strategy in which it would exploit the fall of the USSR to expand its 
power as far across the globe as possible.  
 In search of new villains, US military strategists began to seek out scenarios 
where US interests might, in their minds, necessitate military intervention. In one such 
scenario, military strategists turned to the Persian Gulf. According to Richard Murphy:  
So while observers wouldn’t have seen any basic shift in American foreign 
policy, there were elements, and notably in command of the Central Command 
that were entertaining the potential of a new danger from Iraq. There had been a 
major annual military exercise, the commander was Norman Schwarzkopf, and he 
changed the basic scenario of a threat to American interests by saying there’s no 
longer a serious threat from the Soviet Union, and he introduced this scenario of 
an Iraqi attack on Kuwait.235  
 
 While the US had been contemplating the possibility of a war with Iraq behind the 
scenes, in public the US continued to assure Iraq that it desired a continuation of close 
relations. In 1990, several developments put the US and Iraq at odds. In February, Voice 
of America beamed a hostile broadcast into Iraq, replete with scathing criticisms of 
Saddam Hussein.236 Likewise, Saddam made an inflammatory statement, warning that if 
Israel launched any aggressive acts against Iraq, then it would “devour half of Israel by 
fire.”237 In March, six Iraqis were arrested in Britain for attempting to smuggle nuclear 
triggers known as krytrons from the US through Britain.238 Next, despite the Reagan and 
                                                
234 Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 652 
235 Charmelot 
236 Bruce Jentleson, With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982-1990 (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), 145 
237 Aburish, 275 
238 Jeff Gerth, “Atom Bomb Parts Seized In Britain En Route to Iraq”, New York Times, 29 March 
1990, https://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/29/world/atom-bomb-parts-seized-in-britain-en-route-to-
iraq.html. 
86 
Bush administrations striking down Congressional sanctions, and urging a continuation 
of CCC loans to Iraq, the CCC reduced Iraq’s access to commodity credits.239  
Perhaps what did the most to drive a wedge between Iraq and the West was the 
execution of Iranian-born British journalist Farzad Bazoft. In September 1989, Bazoft 
arrived in Iraq to investigate an explosion at a missile plant south of Baghdad. Seeking to 
keep news of the incident from leaking, and concealing the fact that the plant was 
dedicated to arms production, Bazoft was arrested. After six weeks of detention and 
abuse at Abu Ghraib prison, Bazoft was charged with being an Israeli and British agent, 
and sentenced to death. Following the execution, Britain responded by recalling its 
ambassador from Iraq. The execution itself was cruel enough, but Iraqi rhetoric such as 
“Thatcher wanted him alive. We sent him back in a box,” fueled a growing public outcry, 
driving a deeper rift between Iraq and its Western sponsors.240 
Despite these developments, and growing criticism of Iraq in the west, the US 
reassured Iraq that it wanted to maintain a close relationship. Secretary of State James 
Baker ordered Ambassador April Glaspie to issue a formal apology to Iraq for the hostile 
VOA broadcasts. Glaspie then wrote a letter to Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in which she 
emphasized “President Bush wants good relations with Iraq, relations built on confidence 
and trust, so that we can discuss a broad range of issues frankly and fruitfully.”241 With 
regard to the Bazoft execution, the official US response was one of indifference. When 
pressed by a reporter if the US was going to take any concrete steps, as opposed to 
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rhetorical condemnation, or with silence as it did before Bazoft’s execution, White House 
spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler replied:  
I don’t know. Let me check on that. I know we have deplored this. We have made 
a very strong statement. I did not think to ask, are we going to protest it or 
withdraw our ambassador, et cetera. I’ll be glad to ask.242 
 
In April, shortly after Bazoft’s execution, Senator Robert Dole led a US 
delegation to meet Saddam in Mosul. The topic that dominated the talks was US media 
criticism of Iraq. According to the senators present, Saddam was under the impression 
that Bush was in control of the US media, just as he was in control of Iraqi media. 
Senator Alan Simpson assuaged Saddam’s concerns by saying “I believe that your 
problems lies with the Western media, and not with the U.S. government,” and by 
describing the press as “haughty and pampered.” Senator Dole falsely informed Saddam 
that the VOA staffer responsible for the hostile broadcast was fired.243 
While the Bush administration sought to reassure Iraq of its intent to pursue closer 
relations, Saddam continued to harbor suspicions that the US wanted to undermine Iraq. 
More specifically, he believed that the US had encouraged the Kuwaitis and Emiratis to 
wage economic war on Iraq. At the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq’s foreign debt had 
greatly affected its ability to finance reconstruction. Saddam appealed to the Gulf Arab 
states to forgive, or at least reschedule Iraq’s debt. He argued that the war with Iran was 
not fought for the sake of Iraq alone, but for defense of the Persian Gulf, and indeed the 
entire Arab world.244 Whereas Saudi Arabia proved more accommodating to Iraq’s 
economic predicament, Kuwait demanded a full repayment of debt, and refused to amend 
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the terms. Further adding to Iraq’s woes were low oil prices, largely being driven by 
Kuwaiti overproduction. According to Saddam, for every dollar drop in the price of oil 
per barrel, Iraq was losing $1 billion annually.245 To add insult to injury, Kuwait had been 
horizontally drilling into the Iraqi side of the North Rumaila oil field, stealing up to $2.4 
billion worth of Iraqi oil.246 Throughout the period, Saddam asked Kuwait to cease 
overproduction, and to abide by its OPEC quota. Despite numerous meetings between 
Iraqi and Kuwaiti officials, and Iraqi attempts to mobilize Arab support to put pressure on 
Kuwait, Kuwait continued to overproduce oil. “Kuwait neither accepts nor is bound by its 
assigned quota,” declared Kuwait oil minister Ali Khalifa al-Sabah.247 The US was fully 
aware of these developments. According to a Bush administration official:  
Kuwait was overproducing, and when the Iraqis came and said, ‘Can you do 
something about it?’ the Kuwaitis said, ‘Sit on it.’ And they didn’t even say it 
nicely. They were nasty about it. They were stupid. They were arrogant. They 
were terrible.248  
 
With tensions mounting and the threat of war looming over the horizon, Iraq and 
the rest of the world looked to the US for a response. Amid the deployment of Iraqi armor 
units to the border with Kuwait, a reporter asked State Department spokesperson 
Margaret Tutwiler if, in the event of hostilities, the US was obliged to step in to protect 
Kuwait. Tutwiler’s response was that “we do not have any defense treaties with Kuwait, 
and there are no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait.”249 This statement 
was repeated by Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly during testimony before 
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Congress.250 Secretary of State James Baker insisted that calls for the US to retaliate in 
the event of Iraqi WMD use were “a little bit premature.”251 Amid such lukewarm and 
indecisive statements, the Iraqi leadership began to conclude that, after almost a decade 
of support during the Iran-Iraq War, supplying chemical weapons precursors, biological 
samples, technology for its ballistic missile and nuclear programs, military intelligence, 
agriculture and commodity credits, and after overlooking such incidents such as the USS 
Stark and the Halabja massacre, that the US would not object in any meaningful way to 
an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.  
Saddam’s assessment of US attitudes seemed to be correct. On 25 July 1990, 
Saddam summoned US ambassador April Glaspie to discuss the ongoing crisis. 
According to a State Department cable, the US was fully aware of Iraq’s predicament:  
Saddam wished to convey an important message to President Bush: Iraq wants 
friendship, but does the USG [US government]? Iraq suffered 100,000’s of 
casualties and is now so poor that war orphan pensions will be cut; yet rich 
Kuwait will not even accept OPEC discipline. Iraq is sick of war, but Kuwait has 
ignored diplomacy. USG maneuvers with the UAE will encourage the UAE and 
Kuwait to ignore conventional diplomacy. If Iraq is publicly humiliated by the 
USG, it will have no choice but to “respond,” however illogical and self-
destructive that would prove.252  
 
When asked about the US position on the Iraq-Kuwait dispute, Glaspie responded that 
“we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with 
Kuwait.”253  
After the meeting, Saddam was convinced that the US would not oppose an 
invasion. The US had not given an explicit green light, nor had it given an explicit red 
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light, but rather a yellow light. Eight days later, on 2 August, Iraq invaded Kuwait. In the 
course of only two days, the Iraqi military managed to occupy the entire country, sending 
the ruling Sabah family into exile, and proclaiming Kuwait the 19th province of Iraq. 
Immediately after the invasion, Glaspie fell under heavy scrutiny. Testifying before a 
Congressional hearing, Glaspie remarked that “we foolishly did not realize how stupid he 
was, that he did not believe our clear and repeated warnings that we would support our 
vital interests.”254 However, as the record shows, there were no such warnings. Iraq was 
given no reason to assume that a hostile action against Kuwait would be punished, neither 
by her or the US government at large. As Glaspie explained in a New York Times 
interview: “Obviously, I didn’t think - and nobody else did - that the Iraqis would take all 
of Kuwait.”255 Thus, it appears, a partial invasion of Kuwait would have been acceptable 
to the US. Just how partial was not specified, but a full invasion proved to be a fatal 
mistake. Like many past US clients, Saddam made the fatal mistake of acting too 
independently of the US, and growing too powerful to control. On the day that Iraqi tanks 
crossed into Kuwait, Saddam outlived his usefulness to the US. From that day on, the US 
sought to overthrow Saddam.  
As if by the flip of a switch, cautious US rhetoric became hostile, in some cases 
unrestrained. Acts of aggression, tolerated when Iran was the target, was condemned 
when Kuwait was the target. “Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom, and the 
freedom of friendly countries around the world will suffer if control of the world’s great 
oil reserves fell in the hands of one man,” proclaimed President Bush.256 Secretary of 
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State James Baker declared  “It is not about Kuwait and the flow of oil from its wells but 
about a dictator who, acting alone, could strangle the global economic order, determine 
whether we all enter into recession or the darkness of a depression.”257 Bush’s rhetoric 
went further, comparing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait with the German invasion of 
Poland, and Saddam with Hitler. Likewise, Bush suggested that Saddam be subject to 
Nuremberg-style trials, and handled accordingly. Failure to accede to US demands, Bush 
warned, “could be world war tomorrow.” An alarmed Bush administration official 
remarked that someone needed “to get his rhetoric under control.”258 
From Saddam’s perspective, there was no reason to believe that the US response 
would be as hostile as it was. Unbeknownst to Saddam, while the US was assuring Iraq 
that it took no position on “Arab on Arab disputes”, it had been making security 
assurances to Kuwait. According to Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh Salem al-Sabah, 
“Schwarzkopf came here a few times and met with the Crown Prince and Minister of 
Defense. These became routine visits to discuss military cooperation, and by the time the 
crisis with Iraq began last year, we knew we could rely on the Americans.”259 With US 
assurances, Kuwait felt that it could continue its oil overproduction agenda, and blatantly 
disregard Iraqi concerns. On 30 July, during one of the last Arab mediation efforts in 
Jeddah between Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt, the Kuwaiti delegation 
declared “We are not going to respond to [Iraq] … If they don’t like it, let them occupy 
our territory ... We are going to bring in the Americans.”260 By the time Iraq had invaded 
Kuwait, Saddam was convinced that he had been deceived by the US. During the 
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invasion, Iraqi forces discovered a Kuwaiti security memo, detailing a meeting between 
US and Kuwaiti officials in 1989, in which both sides discussed a covert effort to 
undermine Iraq economically. The memo read: “We agreed with the American side that it 
was important to take advantage of the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq in order to 
put pressure on that country’s government to delineate our common border. The Central 
Intelligence Agency gave us its view of appropriate means of pressure, saying that broad 
cooperation should be initiated between us, on condition that such activities are 
coordinated at a high level.”261 The validity of the memo has been debated. The CIA, for 
example, issued denials, stating that the document was a forgery, and denying that Iraq 
was discussed “at that meeting.”262 Iraq claimed the document was genuine, and 
submitted it to UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar for review. Based on the 
knowledge of past meetings between US and Kuwaiti officials, there is ample reason to 
suspect that the document is in fact authentic.  
The US had no intention of letting the occupation of Kuwait stand. Immediately, 
the US moved to rally the support of the international community to isolate Iraq, and end 
the occupation of Kuwait. Starting in August 1990, the UN Security Council passed a 
series of resolutions concerning the Kuwait invasion. The first condemnation and demand 
for an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal was issued under Resolution 660.263 Under 
Resolution 661, the Security Council implemented an embargo against all imports to and 
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exports from Iraq and Kuwait.264 Under Resolution 678, the US obtained the much 
sought after approval for the use of force. In the language of the resolution: “Authorizes 
Member States [...] to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 
660.”265 Inherent in the resolution were flaws which inevitably led to gross abuse of 
international law, in effect giving the US a blank check to wage total war against Iraq. 
Former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark criticized the resolution as: 
a complete abandonment of UN duty, an open and unlimited assignment of all its 
power. It conveyed the authority to begin the very act the UN was created to end - 
waging war. The Security Council delegation of power was so complete, that in 
addition to giving no guidance and imposing no limitation, it required no 
reporting. The Security Council did not even ask to know what was done on its 
authority and in its name.266 
 
With the passage of Resolution 678, the US set out to form a coalition to give a 
multilateral veneer to US actions. This policy was outlined during the Clinton 
administration by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright: “We act multilaterally when we 
can, and unilaterally when we must.”267 Although numerous states joined the coalition, 
the US was the undisputed leader, making the critical decisions, and doing the bulk of the 
fighting. UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar complained that “It was not a 
United Nations war. General Schwarzkopf was not wearing a blue helmet.”268  
In securing the necessary UN resolutions, and forming the coalition, the US 
resorted to a combination of arm twisting and bribery. To avoid a Chinese veto, the US 
promised to tone down its criticisms of the Tiananmen Square massacre, and to help 
secure loans for China through the World Bank. Similarly, the USSR was promised aid 
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from the US and its allies. Next were the non-permanent members of the Security 
Council. Zaire was promised military aid and debt forgiveness. Ethiopia was promised an 
investment deal. Zimbabwe dropped its objections after the threat of an IMF loan being 
canceled. Next came the effort to enroll an Arab contingent in the coalition, providing for 
an Arab facade. Initially reluctant to welcome US forces, Saudi Arabia was promised $12 
billion in arms sales. Egyptian participation was secured with the US cancelling $7 
billion in debt, and pressure on other states to cancel Egyptian debt as well. The US 
secured Syrian participation by extending $1 billion in arms and aid, and by giving Syria 
carte blanche to do as it pleased in Lebanon. Turkey, although not a member of the 
coalition, allowed coalition forces to use Turkey as a staging area. This was done with the 
help of $8 billion in arms, $1.5 billion in low-cost loans from the IMF, and US 
sponsorship of a Turkish application to the European Community. In exchange for its 
neutrality, Iran was promised a $250 million World Bank loan, its first loan since the 
1979 revolution.269 When Yemen vetoed a US-backed resolution, Secretary of State 
James Baker told the Yemeni delegation “that is the most expensive no vote you will ever 
cast,” followed by a drastic cut in US aid.270  
Amid the build-up to war, discussions of ending the crisis by diplomatic means 
were conspicuously absent in the US. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, Iraq sent out feelers 
indicating its desire to negotiate and end to the crisis and affect a withdrawal. Granted, 
each peace overture could individually be assessed according to its merit. According to 
Just War Theory, which forms part of the foundation of international law regarding the 
conduct of armed conflict, war is a last resort which is only to be used when other options 
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have been exhausted.271 Iraq’s numerous peace overtures, regardless of their merit, 
should at least have been explored by the US. What is clear is that the US wanted war.  
While the US ignored Saddam’s overtures, his Arab neighbors proved responsive. 
The Arab states involved in mediation efforts came to the conclusion that Saddam was 
willing to withdraw from Kuwait, provided he be allowed to do so in a manner where he 
could save face. A US Congressional staffer concurred, stating that “The Iraqis 
apparently believed that having invaded Kuwait, they would get everyone’s attention, 
negotiate improvements to their economic situation, and pull out … a diplomatic solution 
satisfactory to the interests of the United States may well have been possible since the 
earliest days of the invasion.”272 First and foremost in pushing for a peaceful settlement 
was King Hussein of Jordan. Joined by Egypt, the King announced that Saddam was 
willing to withdraw, provided that the Arab League did not condemn Iraq. When King 
Hussein informed Bush of his intent to pursue this line of diplomacy further, Bush told 
Hussein that he had 48 hours to reach an agreement that led to an Iraqi withdrawal. Bush 
presented an unrealistic ultimatum, one which allowed him to make a symbolic and 
insincere effort to play peacemaker, an effort which would ultimately not stand in the 
way of launching a war against Iraq. 273 Seeking a pretext to maintain astronomical levels 
of military spending, establish a forward military presence in the Middle East, and to 
punish its former client, the US wanted war.  
With a coalition ready, the US drew up a plan for war. US war planners and 
policymakers were thinking big. Although exhausted by eight years of war, Iraq 
maintained the largest military in the Middle East, one complimented with chemical, 
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biological, and ballistic missile arsenals. The onslaught which followed was to be 
merciless, targeting every level of Iraqi society, including a systematic and deliberate 
targeting of the civilian infrastructure, paving the way for an enormous humanitarian 
catastrophe. The exact consequences were fully anticipated by the US, under a DIA study 
titled Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities. The aim of the study was to map out the 
consequences of an attack on the water treatment infrastructure of Iraq. The study started 
out by noting that “Iraq depends on importing specialized equipment and some chemicals 
to purify its water supply.” Amid sanctions, “failing to secure supplies will result in a 
shortage of pure drinking water for much of the population. This could lead to increased 
incidences, if not epidemics” of diseases such as “cholera, typhoid, and hepatitis.” Prior 
to the invasion, Iraq had “probably had no more than a 2-month supply “for water 
treatment, and as a result of sanctions alone, “it probably will take six months (to June 
1991) before the system is fully degraded.” As it stood, “the water treatment system was 
unreliable even before the United Nations sanctions.” In addition to the direct 
humanitarian consequences, the study weighed the consequences on the Iraqi economy, 
with “pure-water dependent industries becoming incapacitated, including petro 
chemicals, fertilizers, petroleum refining, electronics, pharmaceuticals, food processing, 
textiles, concrete construction, and thermal power plants.”274 Despite the knowledge that 
a massive onslaught would produce an enormous humanitarian catastrophe, US war 
planners went through with their plans anyways.  
The plan that the US military implemented was called Operations Plan (OPLAN) 
1002-90. Originally devised as a contingency plan to defend against a Soviet thrust 
through Iran to the Persian Gulf, the plan was revised, with Iraq taking the place of the 
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USSR. The plan, originally devised to fight a superpower, was applied to a regional third-
world power, already exhausted after 8 years of war. In the lead-up to the war, General 
Schwarzkopf declared “the United States might obliterate Iraq.” Another US general 
remarked “we are closer to war with a Third World country. However, we are making 
plans as if it will be the Third World War.”275 Air Force Chief Michael Dugan remarked 
that it was important to target “what is unique Iraqi culture that they put a very high value 
on.”276 Fearing that Iraq might make use of its chemical and biological weapons against 
the coalition, Secretary of State James Baker issued a warning to his Iraqi counterpart 
Tariq Aziz: “We know that you have a vast stock of chemical weapons … Our sincere 
advice is not to even think of using them. If you do, or if we feel that you did, then our 
reply will be unrestrained.”277 This threat was broadly understood to include a threatened 
use of nuclear weapons.  
When Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm got underway, the US 
response was largely unrestrained, bombing targets which went far beyond military 
necessity. During the course of the air campaign, in the 42 days from 16 January to 27 
February, coalition forces dropped over 88,000 tons of bombs on Iraq, equivalent to a 
Hiroshima-sized bomb a week for seven weeks.278 Among the targets of the campaign 
were stores, markets, residential neighborhoods, water and electrical facilities, schools, 
universities, hospitals, pharmacies, and archaeological sites. In one of the more well-
known incidents of a civilian target being struck by US bombs, on 13 February 1991, two 
US laser-guided bombs struck the Amiriyah civilian air raid shelter, killing everyone 
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inside, save for 17 people who managed to escape after the first bomb struck. Estimates 
vary as to how many people were killed, from 400 to 1,500, and given the shelter’s 
capacity of 2,500, potentially even higher.279 Part of the difficulty in identifying the 
number of people killed was due to the grotesque manner in which the victims perished. 
British MP Tam Dalyell, who visited the shelter, reported seeing the carbonized imprints 
of the victims on the walls.280 According to an account provided by the Columbia 
Journalism Review:  
Nearly all the bodies were charred into blackness; in some cases the heat had been 
so great that entire limbs were burned off. Among the corpses were those of at 
least six babies and ten children, most of them so severely burned that their 
gender could not be determined. Rescue workers collapsed in grief, dropping 
corpses; some rescuers vomited from the stench of the still-smoldering bodies.281  
 
Despite earlier denials, the US admitted to bombing Amiriyah, but with a caveat. White 
House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater remarked “It was a military target … We don’t know 
why civilians were at this location, but we do know that Saddam Hussein does not share 
our value in the sanctity of life.”282  
Despite the expected fierce resistance from the Iraqis, and predictions of US 
casualties running into the tens of thousands, Iraq was almost entirely powerless to stop 
the US-led onslaught. According to former DIA officer and later advisor to General 
Schwarzkopf, Rick Francona, the air campaign was so devastating that many US officers 
forecasted a potential Iraqi withdrawal coming about without the need of a ground 
campaign. “If the Iraqis were to state their intention to leave Kuwait prior to the initiation 
of the ground offensive,” wrote Francona, “they might escape with much of their combat 
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power intact, leaving Baghdad with the wherewithal to continue its past pattern of 
unacceptable behavior.”283 As such, the US launched a ground war into Kuwait, and after 
expelling Iraqi forces, pushed into Iraq. Thus, the US exceeded the bounds of Resolution 
678, which called for the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait, upholding Resolution 
660.284 Now that Saddam had acted too independently of the US, the US set out not only 
to punish Iraq for its act of aggression, but also to mercilessly destroy the monster it 
helped create.  
This strategy was made abundantly clear during one of the most well-known 
episodes of the war. During the last days of the war in February, a column of fleeing Iraqi 
soldiers were trapped in a traffic jam along Highway 80, connecting Kuwait City with 
Basra. US aircraft attacked the head and tail of the over mile-long traffic jam, trapping 
the retreating Iraqi forces. US aircraft then proceeded to bomb and strafe the entire 
column with cluster bombs, napalm, and depleted uranium munitions. A US officer 
compared the attack to a “turkey shoot,” stating that “it was like turning on the kitchen 
light late at night and the cockroaches started scurrying. We finally got them out where 
we could find them and kill them.”285 What was left was a mile-long scrapyard of 
twisted, tangled, and charred metal, surrounded by death. Journalist Greg LaMotte, who 
surveyed the aftermath, described “what you could only describe as a massacre [...] this 
was the most horrific thing I had seen in my life: bodies everywhere, body parts 
everywhere.”286 Tony Clifton of Newsweek described “bodies all over the place … I was 
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up to my ankles in blood … there were very white-faced men going around saying, 
‘Jesus. Did we really do this?’.”287  
With Iraqi forces in retreat, the US continued giving chase, occupying large 
swaths of southern Iraq. Despite the collapse of combat effectiveness and morale of the 
Iraqi forces, and despite the US goal of toppling Saddam Hussein, US forces did not 
move to occupy Baghdad. Bush administration Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney 
provided an explanation for why this was:  
Because if we had gone to Baghdad we would have been all alone. There 
wouldn’t have been anybody else with us. It would have been a US occupation of 
Iraq. None of the Arab forces that were willing to fight with us in Kuwait were 
willing to invade Iraq. Once you got to Iraq and took it over. And took down 
Saddam Hussein’s government, then what are you going to put in its place? It’s a 
very volatile part of the world, and if you take down the central government in 
Iraq you can easily end up seeing pieces of Iraq fly off. Part of it the Syrians 
would like to have, to the west. Part of eastern Iraq, the Iranians would like to 
claim, fought over for eight years. In the north you’ve got the Kurds. If the Kurds 
spill loose and join with the Kurds in Turkey then you threaten the territorial 
integrity of Turkey. It’s a quagmire if you go that far and try to take over Iraq.288 
 
Although the US wished to see Saddam removed from power, it was not willing to 
occupy to accomplish this goal. Furthermore, the overthrow of Saddam was not 
guaranteed to be instantaneous, with the potential of becoming a long-term endeavor. If 
Saddam could not be overthrown right away, then, in the meanwhile, the “policy is to 
keep Iraq in its box.”289 Instead, the US devised a series of policies to accomplish the 
same goal by other means.  
 This policy was first put in practice in February, in the last weeks of the war, 
when Bush appealed to the Iraqi people. “But there’s another way for the bloodshed to 
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stop,” declared Bush, “and that is for the Iraqi military, and the Iraqi people, to take 
matters into their own hands, to force Saddam Hussein the dictator to step aside.”290 
Similar statements by US officials calling for an uprising were followed by CIA 
propaganda radio broadcasts, including one where a man purported to be an Iraqi defector 
urged the Iraqi people to:  
Rise up to save the homeland from the clutches of dictatorship so that you can 
devote yourself to avoid the dangers of the continuation of the war and 
destruction. Honourable sons of the Tigris and the Euphrates, at these decisive 
moments of your life, and while facing the danger of death at the hands of foreign 
forces, you have no option in order to survive and defend the homeland but to put 
an end to the dictator and his criminal gang. Prove to your people and nation that 
you are faithful and honorable sons of this generous country and this honourable 
nation. Stage a revolution now, before it is too late. He thinks of himself alone. 
He is not interested in what suffering you have endured the past few months of 
this destructive crisis. He insists on continuing to push your faithful sons into this 
massacre in defence of his false glory, privileges and criminal leadership.291  
 
In the south, Shia militants, as well as some retreating Iraqi soldiers, launched a revolt. 
Similarly, the Kurds, either forgetting or disregarding the record of US betrayals, from 
1975 to sweeping Halabja under the rug, heeded the call and launched a rebellion as well.  
Once more, history was repeating itself. As with the “cynical enterprise” of 1972-
1975, the US took a series of actions to ensure that the rebellion put as much pressure on 
the Ba’ath government as possible, yet without being able to score a decisive victory and 
threaten the territorial integrity of Iraq. By encouraging a mutiny, Bush hoped to provoke 
a military coup. When a mass insurrection erupted instead, US officials were alarmed. 
Bush explained that “we were concerned that the uprisings would sidetrack the overthrow 
of Saddam by causing the Iraqi military to rally around him.”292 According to former CIA 
                                                
290 Charmelot 
291 Fisk, 646 
292 Patrick Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr and the Battle for the Future of Iraq (Expanded Edition) 
(New York: Scribner, 2003), 66 
102 
case officer Robert Baer, “we were afraid of upsetting the balance in the Gulf between 
the Shia and the Sunni.”293 Providing further detail, Zalmay Khalilzad, director of policy 
planning at the State Department, explained: “The partition of Iraq will not serve our 
long-term interests. Iraqi disintegration will improve prospects for Iranian domination of 
the Gulf and remove a restraint on Syria.”294  
When the uprising erupted, the US stated its intention to stay neutral. According 
to Marine Major General Martin Brandtner, “There is no move on [the part] of U.S. 
forces to let weapons slip through [to the rebels], or to play any role whatsoever in 
fomenting or assisting any side.”295 This assertion, however, is false, as US actions 
helped ensure that Iraq could crush the uprisings and exact collective punishment on the 
Kurdish and Shia populations at will. During the official surrender talks at Safwan, 
General Schwarzkopf assured the Iraqis that, while Iraqi planes were barred from flying, 
helicopters could be flown so long as they did not pose a threat to coalition forces.296 
Whatever the intent of this agreement, it enabled Iraq to deploy troop transport and 
gunship helicopters to crush the rebellions with greater ferocity and speed. Although the 
US, UK, and France had established no-fly zones in the north and south, nothing was 
done to halt the heliborne slaughter. Additionally, the US refused to provide direct 
assistance to the rebels, and in some cases bombed arms stockpiles before the rebels 
could get ahold of them. In the end, the rebellion was crushed, with tens of thousands 
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dead.297 One Iraqi colonel who participated in the crackdown puts the death toll closer to 
150,000.298  
US actions surrounding the 1991 uprisings demonstrated the US policy of regime 
change, one in which the US sought the overthrow of Saddam, but not the dismantling of 
his system. This was essential to hold Iraq together to maintain a somewhat feasible 
deterrent to Iranian ambitions. At the same time, the US wanted to eliminate Iraq’s ability 
to conduct aggressive actions against its neighbors. In the course of the Gulf War, this 
aim had been achieved in large measure with the destruction of WMD and ballistic 
missile sites and with the Iraqi military as a whole being devastated. The deliberate and 
systematic destruction, coupled with sanctions, ensured that Iraq would largely be unable 
to rebuild its military. To further this end in the post-war period, the US lent its support to 
UN Resolution 687. Among the most important stipulations of the resolution were those 
which called for a complete disarmament of the Iraqi WMD program, including chemical 
and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, and 
nuclear program. To conduct inspections, disarmament, and monitoring of Iraq’s 
chemical, biological, and ballistic missile programs, the UN created the UN Special 
Commission (UNSCOM). To dismantle Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, seize its 
weapons-grade material, and enforce Iraqi compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty, the UN issued a mandate to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).299  
However, as is became evidently clear, Resolution 678 was doomed from the start. First, 
as UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter explained:  
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Security Council 687 is an absolute resolution … Iraq will not be found in 
compliance until it has been disarmed to a 100 percent level … And this was the 
Achilles tendon, so to speak, of UNSCOM. Because by the time 1997 came 
around, Iraq had been qualitatively disarmed. On any meaningful benchmark - in 
terms of defining Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capability, in terms of 
assessing whether or not Iraq posed a threat, not only to its immediate neighbors, 
but the region and the world as a whole - Iraq had been eliminated as such a 
threat.300 
 
Now that Iraq had been expelled from Kuwait, the primary justification for maintaining 
sanctions was disarmament. In other words, the lifting of sanctions was linked to Iraq’s 
cooperation with UNSCOM. Yet the absolute resolution ensured that a mere bureaucratic 
error here or a loose chemical artillery shell there would get in the way of certifying Iraq 
as fully, quantitatively disarmed.  
 Even if Iraq had been disarmed 100 percent, down to the very last artillery shell, 
with every last page related to the WMD program accounted for, it would have had no 
effect on the lifting of sanctions. The US made it clear that it would use its veto power in 
the Security Council to maintain sanctions in order to create and maintain the conditions 
for regime change. White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater remarked that “all possible 
sanctions will be maintained until he is gone.” CIA director Robert Gates stated that “any 
easing of sanctions will be eased only when there is a new government.” In March 1997, 
despite announcements from UNSCOM officials that Iraq had been largely disarmed and 
that sanctions should be lifted accordingly, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
remarked: “We do not agree with those nations that argue that if Iraq complies with its 
obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction, [that] sanctions should be lifted.”301  
 The idea of imposing sanctions in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and as 
leverage for Iraqi compliance for UNSCOM was agreed upon in the Security Council. 
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Where disagreement arose was over scope and duration. Sanctions against Iraq were first 
implemented under Resolution 661. Under 661, all imports from and exports to Iraq were 
prohibited, with the exception of shipments meant “exclusively for strictly medical or 
humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian purposes, foodstuffs.”302 On its face, the 
language of the resolution seemed straightforward. However, in the absence of any 
working definitions for terms such as “humanitarian purposes” and “foodstuffs” ensured 
that such terms could be arbitrarily defined by the members of the Security Council. 
When non-permanent member Yemen proposed to create a framework to establish 
working definitions for the terms, providing the Committee with a swift process to enable 
the delivery of humanitarian goods, the US struck down the proposal.303 Such arbitrary 
political interpretations were put to work by the US, with tragic consequences.  
 The primary vehicle through which the US maintained sanctions was the 
Sanctions Committee. Established under Resolution 661, the Committee decided which 
items could be imported into Iraq.304 The Committee staff were provided by the members 
of the Security Council, and as such, all decisions made by the Committee were subject 
to veto by its members. Under Resolution 661, and reaffirmed under Resolution 687, the 
Committee was required to make exceptions for medical and humanitarian goods, and 
foodstuffs.305 However, with no criteria established for defining what constitutes 
humanitarian or medical goods, and due to the inherent operating mechanism of the 
Committee, the US was able to use the body to make sanctions hurt the Iraqi people as 
much as possible, barring the entry of essential goods needed to sustain life in a society. 
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The US was able to maintain the sanctions through its veto power, and through the 
operating mechanism of the Sanctions Committee.  
 The mechanism implemented by the Sanctions Committee ensured that the 
overwhelming majority of urgently-needed goods would not be delivered in a timely 
fashion, if at all. If any organization wanted to conduct business with Iraq, the 
organization would need to enter consultations with the Committee at every step of the 
way. In order to merely talk with potential Iraqi buyers, a seller needed to apply for a 
negotiating license, which would be processed in three to four weeks. If in the course of 
negotiations the buyer and seller reached a deal, the seller would then have to apply for a 
supply license, taking up to 20 weeks. Amid the bureaucratic delay, inflation of the Iraqi 
dinar spiraled further out of control, it was highly likely that the Iraqi buyer would be 
forced to cancel the order, if not accept a reduced quantity of quality delivery. However, 
if any change was made to the original deal, the Committee demanded the buyer and 
seller start the process all over again. Throughout the process, any member of the 
Committee could demand a deal be subject to further review, or strike down a deal. 
Typically, it was the US and/or UK which took such actions, vetoing the deliveries of 
items included but not limited to: food, medicine, clothing, toiletries, household 
electronics, textbooks, pencils, vaccines, and many more. The sanctions were so strict 
that when an Iraqi woman attempted mailing hand-knitted leggings for her daughter and 
grandchild in London, the daughter was informed by the UK Customs and Excise that if 
she wanted to receive the leggings, she would first have to apply for an import license 
through the Sanctions Committee.306 
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 Already, by 1991, the sanctions, combined with the Gulf War, had a devastating 
effect on Iraqi society. In March, one month after the war, a UN investigative team led by 
Martti Ahtisaari traveled to Iraq. In his report, Ahtisaari reported:  
nothing that we had seen or read had quite prepared us for the particular form of 
devastation which has now befallen the country. The recent conflict has wrought 
near-apocalyptic results upon the economic infrastructure of what had been, until 
January 1991, a rather urbanized and mechanized society. Now, most means of 
modern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous. Iraq has, for some 
time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age, but with all the disabilities of 
post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of energy and technology.307  
 
Additionally, following a visit to Iraq, a Harvard study team published a report 
forecasting that if the conditions maintained and exacerbated by the sanctions regime 
persisted, 170,000 children under 5 years of age would die, largely from water-borne 
diseases exacerbated by chronic malnutrition.308  
 The scourging of Iraqi society had gone to plan. The US hoped that by using its 
veto power in the Sanctions Committee that it could prolong sanctions indefinitely, 
making life within Iraq so miserable that elements within the country, namely the 
military, could be compelled into launching a coup against Saddam. “We wanted to let 
the people know, ‘Get rid of this guy, and we’ll be more than happy to assist in 
rebuilding. We’re not going to tolerate Saddam Hussein or his regime. Fix that and we’ll 
fix your electricity,” said a US military planner.309 Another Pentagon planner remarked 
candidly: “Well, what were we trying to do with sanctions - help out the Iraqi people? 
                                                
307 Javier Perez de Cuellar, Letter Dated 20 March 1991 From the Secretary General Addressed 
to the President of the Security Council (United Nations Security Council, 1991), 5 
308 Blum, 355 
309 Fisk, 706 
108 
No. What we were doing with attacks on infrastructure was to accelerate the effects of 
sanctions.”310 Similarly, Colonel John Warden III commented:  
Saddam Hussein cannot restore his own electricity. He needs help. If there are 
political objectives that the U.N. coalition has, it can say, “Saddam, when you 
agree to do these things, we will allow people to come in and fix your electricity.” 
It gives us long-term leverage.311 
 
 Indeed, sanctions were effective in creating a climate for regime change, one 
which the US readily exploited. In October 1991, the CIA issued a finding, creating the 
Iraq Operations Group, authorizing the agency to facilitate efforts to overthrow Saddam 
Hussein. The CIA partnered with Iraqi exile opposition groups such as Ahmed Chalabi’s 
Iraqi National Congress and Iyad Alawi’s Iraqi National Accord, who in turn helped 
connect the CIA with members of the Iraqi military with the means and desire to launch a 
coup. In one such effort, the CIA enlisted a defector named Muhammad Abdullah al-
Shawani, who in turn enlisted three of his brothers in the security services to launch the 
coup. However, the plot was infiltrated and thwarted by the Iraqi security services in 
1996.312 According to former CIA case officer Robert Baer, from 1994 to 1995, a series 
of CIA teams, under Kurdish protection, infiltrated into Iraq, scouring for opportunities to 
organize a coup, and recruit willing candidates. In January 1995, Baer reported, a CIA 
team submitted a coup plan to the White House, which was ultimately rejected for 
unspecified reasons.313 Amid CIA-instigated efforts, there also emerged some indigenous 
coup attempts. In one such attempt, a group of military officers from the Dulaimi 
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launched a failed coup. In response, Saddam engaged in collective punishment of the 
Dulaimi tribe, and ultimately issued an ultimatum to the tribal leaders that they should 
root out the traitors in their midst, or face greater reprisals.314  
 Throughout the decade, every coup attempt, both US-instigated and indigenous, 
failed, some in very bloody fashion. Despite the repeated failures to bring about regime 
change, the US resisted every international outcry calling for the lifting of sanctions. If 
sanctions could not be used as a tool of regime change, then they could at least be used as 
a tool of containment, while the US devised new strategies. UNSCOM inspector Scott 
Ritter explained the US rationale as follows: “If you lift sanctions, you break 
containment. If you break containment, you no longer have Saddam Hussein under 
control.”315 This tactic seriously jeopardized the UNSCOM mission, and gave Iraq fewer 
and fewer incentives to cooperate. UNSCOM director Rolf Ekeus warned that “The US 
position is that the embargo will not be lifted as long as Saddam is on power. There is no 
incentive for Iraq to cooperate.”316 Inevitably, Iraq lashed out, be it due to the 
continuation of sanctions, or ever more intrusive inspections of Iraq’s most sensitive 
sites, including presidential sites and the headquarters of Iraq’s intelligence agencies.  
 Amid the ongoing sanctions, the US put forth a muddled mix of justifications to 
launch military strikes against Iraq throughout the decade. In some cases, the US claimed 
to be responding to Iraqi noncompliance with UNSCOM, while in other cases, the US 
claimed to be responding to other Iraqi machinations. In one such instance, US and 
Kuwaiti authorities announced that they had intercepted an Iraqi plot to assassinate 
former President Bush in Kuwait in 1993. However, the accusation was of dubious merit. 
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According to Pentagon officials interviewed by NBC, “evidence for the plot was 
questionable and that heavy-handed Kuwaiti interrogation tactics [a euphemism for 
torture]” made the prisoners’ testimony useless.317 Amnesty International expressed 
similar concerns, adding that the prisoners were not given a fair trial and access to 
lawyers, and that they faced possible execution.318 The New York Times commented that 
in order to accept the assertions made by the US government to build a case for striking 
Iraq would require “a leap of faith and a complete suspension of political cynicism.”319 In 
spite of these revelations, on 27 June the US launched 23 cruise missiles at Baghdad.320 
 Just as the UNSCOM mission was moving faster than expected, a crisis was 
manufactured to provide a pretext to prolong the sanctions regime. In October 1994, 
Kuwaiti UN ambassador Muhammad Abulhasan issued a formal complaint to the 
Security Council, alleging that Iraq had made threatening statements to Kuwait. 
According to Abulhasan, Radio Baghdad issued a statement which reads as follows: 
those badly intended parties, especially the American Administration assisted by 
the Chairman of the Special Commission, Rolf Ekeus, granting it the required 
cover-ups, are determined in their pursuit of harming Iraq. This Administration 
and its collaborators in the region, particularly the rulers of Kuwait, are 
determined to prolong the embargo as long as they can in order to kill the largest 
number possible of Iraqis through the policy of starvation and deprivation. This 
policy means to deprive the struggling Iraqi people from medicine and the basic 
needs of life and human rights [...] the Iraqi leadership does not have any other 
alternative but to reconsider a new stand which will restore justice and relieve the 
Iraqi people from the distress imposed upon it. 
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According to Abulhasan, the broadcast constituted a “clear threat against Kuwait”, and an 
attempt by Iraq to “evade its legal responsibilities under Security Council resolution 
687.”321  
 Immediately, the issue was taken up by the Security Council, then under the 
presidency of the Sir David Hannay of the UK. Hannay took Abulhasan’s accusations 
further, alleging that “substantial numbers of Iraqi troops, including units of the Iraqi 
Republican Guard, are being redeployed in the direction of the border with Kuwait.”322 
Certainly, Iraq was growing frustrated with the unending sanctions. Equally clear was the 
intent of the US and Kuwait to maintain sanctions. The US made this clear with repeated 
statements linking the end of sanctions to the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. 
Echoing the position of the al-Sabah ruling family, in 1993 the Kuwaiti newspaper al-
Anbaa declared “We say to the rotten people - yes people not leadership - of Iraq that 
Kuwaitis are much superior to you and much more honourable and pure than you can 
ever be … We say to Iraq as a whole, its people, its regime - present and future - you are 
the lowest of the despicable and pray the Lord to vengefully chastise Iraq and O Lord 
leave not even a stone in Iraq standing upright.”323 However, the impending crisis turned 
out to be hot air. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and his military advisors, hardly 
friends of Iraq, commented that Iraq had neither the manpower or air cover to invade 
Kuwait. Robert Fisk of The Independent reported that “Many reporters in the desert 
discovered just a solitary Kuwaiti tank near the frontier, a vehicle which was 
subsequently used only to tow their own bus out of the sand. On the other side of the 
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border, there were even slimmer pickings.”324 Nonetheless, the Security Council passed 
Resolution 949, condemning “recent military deployments by Iraq in the direction of the 
border with Kuwait.”325 The US scored a propaganda victory, and a means by which to 
delay the lifting of sanctions, despite UNSCOM’s progress in disarming Iraq.  
 While the US continued its pressure campaign against Iraq, the humanitarian 
situation began to spiral further out of control. Through 1992, malnutrition diseases such 
as kwashiorkor and marasmus in children under 5 years multiplied by 11.5 times, while 
diseases such as polio, cholera, scabies, typhoid, measles, pneumonia, viral jaundice, 
malaria, and diphtheria, many of which had been eradicated, had reached epidemic 
proportions.326 According to a December 1992 study published in The New England 
Journal of Medicine, in 1991 alone infant and child mortality rates increased more than 
threefold.327 According to a study by the International Study Team, prices for staple food 
items skyrocketed, such as a 247 percent increase for beef, 4,531 percent increase for 
wheat flour, and items such as milk, bread, baby milk, sugar, cooking oil, rice, tea, 
tomato, chickpeas, potatoes, eggs, onions, dates, and lamb in between.328 By July 1993, 
the school dropout rate approached one-fifth, compared to being negligible before the 
war. One Iraqi school counsellor reported that sometimes children were “so hungry that 
they steal from each other. Often we have to send students home because they are too 
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sick from hunger to be able to sit up.”329 In 1992, a study titled Unheard Voices: Iraqi 
Women on War and Sanctions reported that Iraqi women were suffering from 
malnourishment, irregular menstrual cycles, excessive bleeding, little to no access to 
contraceptives, increased use of abortions (legal and illegal), skyrocketing rates of 
miscarriage, and undergoing cesarean sections without anesthetics.330 In their 1995 study, 
researchers Mary Smith Fawzi and Sarah Zaidi reported that as a direct result of the 
sanctions, as many as 576,000 Iraqi children had died.331 
 Despite the growing international outcry, and an outpouring of information 
documenting the devastating humanitarian catastrophe, the US was unwilling to lift 
sanctions. However, the US realized that if it was to maintain sanctions at all, especially 
given the fact that Iraq had been qualitatively disarmed of its WMDs, it would have to 
support a loosening of sanctions. To this effect, the US voted in favor of UN Resolution 
986, creating the “oil-for-food” program. “As a temporary measure to provide for the 
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people,” the Resolution granted Iraq the ability to export 
petroleum and petroleum products “sufficient to produce a sum not exceeding a total of 
one billion United States dollars every 90 days” under the strict supervision of the 
Security Council. All revenues from the program were to be deposited into an escrow 
account controlled by the Security Council, and released as deemed appropriate.332  
 Seemingly a panacea for Iraq’s humanitarian catastrophe, Resolution 986 proved 
to be more political than practical. One UN aid worker described the oil-for-food 
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program as follows: “We first break their legs and then offer them a crutch.”333 Worse 
than that, the program proved inadequate to alleviate the humanitarian catastrophe, 
warned Iraqi ambassador to the UN, Nizar Hamdoon.334 This appears to be by design. 
According to Resolution 986, citing Resolution 705, Iraq was to pay up to 30 percent of 
its annual petroleum revenues as compensation to Kuwait.335 Additionally, Iraq was 
required to direct part of its revenues to funding UN programs in Iraq, including 
UNSCOM.336 Lastly, Iraq was required to make available up to $10 million every 90 
days for a list of assorted operating costs listed under Resolution 778.337 By the time Iraq 
was able to purchase foodstuffs and medicines, it found that all related transactions were 
still subject to scrutiny by the Sanctions Committee, inevitably leading to delay. The 
delay was such that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan reported that “As at 3 March 
1997, no consignment of humanitarian goods authorized under Resolution 986 (1995) 
had reached Iraq.”338 Lastly, with limited exceptions to oil infrastructure equipment, 
Resolution 986 contained no provisions allowing Iraq to import the supplies and 
equipment necessary to rebuild the civilian infrastructure, devastated and unrepaired 
since the Gulf War, guaranteeing that the humanitarian catastrophe would continue.  
 By 1998, it was clear that the US strategy in Iraq was failing. Despite the 
worsening humanitarian situation, Saddam Hussein remained deeply entrenched, with 
coup after coup being thwarted. International outcry in protest of the sanctions regime 
was growing, both on humanitarian grounds, and on the grounds that Iraq had been 
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effectively disarmed of its WMD capability. One of the largest sources of protest against 
the humanitarian situation came from within the UN. At the forefront of dissent in the 
UN was Denis Halliday, Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq. Halliday reported: 
I recently met with trade union leaders [in Iraq] who asked me why the United 
Nations does not simply bomb the Iraqi people, and do it efficiently, rather than 
extending sanctions which kill Iraqis incrementally over a long period … 
Sanctions are undermining the cultural and educational recovery of Iraq, and will 
not change its system of governance. Sanctions encourage isolation, alienation, 
and fanaticism … Sanctions constitute a serious breach of the United Nations 
charter on human rights and children’s rights.339  
 
Hans von Sponeck, who became Humanitarian Coordinator after Halliday’s resignation, 
decried “We’re treating Iraq as if it were made up of 23 million Saddam Husseins, which 
is rubbish.”340 Like Halliday, von Sponeck resigned in protest, followed by Jutta 
Purghart, head of the UN World Food Program in Iraq.341 In 2000, Halliday commented 
that “we are responsible for a genocide in Iraq.”342  
 With sanctions failing to bring about regime change, US policy began to build 
towards a grim, logical conclusion. As Rolf Ekeus explained, “Sanctions and war are 
linked to each other. So if you go against sanctions [...] there is nothing but war left.”343 
Increasingly, the US began to look towards a military option for Iraq. To facilitate this, 
the US began to push for ever more intrusive UNSCOM inspections targeting some of 
Iraq’s most sensitive sites, including the Ministry of Defense, and a list of presidential 
sites, in the hopes that an Iraqi backlash could be used as a pretext to strike Iraq. After 
Iraq refused to grant UNSCOM inspectors access to several sensitive sites, and amid US 
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threats of military strikes, UNSCOM director Ekeus and Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz 
reached an agreement which balanced Iraq’s security concerns with UNSCOM’s 
inspection mission.344 According to Scott Ritter, this agreement, plus the failure of the 
Shawani coup, “was a strategic disaster for US Iraq policy.”345 Deprived of a plausibly 
deniable covert operations option, and with the resumption of UNSCOM inspections 
denying the US a pretext to strike Iraq, the US doubled down, pushing for more intrusive 
sanctions. 
 By late-1997, Iraq’s patience had worn thin. With the failure of the oil-for-food 
program to deliver any aid, with cooperation with UNSCOM not yielding a lifting of 
sanctions, and suspicions that the US was using UNSCOM as a means to collect 
intelligence to be used in an effort to topple Saddam Hussein, Iraq took the first steps to 
suspend cooperation with UNSCOM. According to Ritter, “by October 1997 the senior 
Iraqi leadership realized that there could be no satisfying UNSCOM’s search for truth 
without compromising the security of Saddam Hussein to an unacceptable level. After the 
withdrawal of UNSCOM 207, the Iraqi government made a decision to stop cooperating 
with UN weapons inspectors until what they deemed the compositional bias (i.e. too 
many American and British inspectors) was addressed.”346 By August 1998, Iraq 
suspended cooperation with UNSCOM, alleging that US intelligence agents were using 
UNSCOM to spy on Saddam Hussein.347  
 Initially, US officials denied the Iraqi allegations, and condemned the Iraqi move 
as an unprovoked act of noncompliance. Despite these denials, US officials later 
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conceded that there was indeed a US-led effort within UNSCOM to spy on Saddam 
Hussein known as “Shake The Tree.”348 To help carry out its mission, UNSCOM had 
developed a sophisticated surveillance network throughout Iraq. That network was 
created in large part with US assistance. Aside from the Iraqi contribution, all related UN 
resolutions set no guidelines for which states should fund and assist UNSCOM, and how 
much they should contribute. Naturally, the US proved the most willing to provide 
assistance. Ritter commented that “the willingness of the USA to provide UNSCOM with 
personnel and material support, was making me feel as if Stu Cohen and the CIA likewise 
were employing tactics based upon the ‘keep your friends close, and your enemies closer’ 
line of thinking.”349 Besides assisting in the construction of a surveillance network used 
for arms inspections, the US created a parallel, independent eavesdropping operation. The 
US did not inform UNSCOM director Ekeus of this operation, nor did it share the 
intelligence collected with UNSCOM. “We were very concerned about protecting our 
independence of access,” remarked a US official. “We did not want to rely on a 
multinational body that might or might not continue to operate as it was operating.”350 
Another US official commented that Shake The Tree intercepts were “normal military 
communications, not related to UNSCOM”, information which UNSCOM declared it had 
no use for.351 According to military affairs analyst William Arkin, the US developed “a 
diagrammatic understanding of the Iraqi government structure, as well as of the 
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intelligence, security and transport organizations that protect the Iraqi leadership.”352 
Ultimately, the UN admitted that “UNSCOM directly facilitated the creation of an 
intelligence collection system for the United States in violation of its mandate. The 
United Nations cannot be party to an operation to overthrow one of its member states. In 
the most fundamental way, that is what's wrong with the UNSCOM operation.”353  
 Following Iraq’s decision to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM, the US 
responded with two measures. The first was the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act in 
October. The Act stated that  “it should be the policy of the United States to seek to 
remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq and to replace it with a 
democratic government.” To accomplish this, the US would support “one or more Iraqi 
democratic opposition organizations” with “military education and training,” radio 
broadcasts, and “humanitarian assistance.”354 In large part, the Act was largely symbolic, 
merely an open acknowledgement of the past seven years of US Iraq policy. At the same 
time, moving what was largely a covert policy unambiguously into public view was 
indicative of how serious the US was about regime change, and was in fact an escalation.  
 The next step was the launching of Operation Desert Fox by the US and UK from 
16-19 December 1998. During the course of the oddly-named operation (Erwin 
Rommel’s nickname was “Desert Fox”), the US launched 200 cruise missiles dropped 
540 bombs on 100 targets, while British planes flew 28 sorties against 11 targets.355 
Ostensibly, the aim of the airstrikes was to punish Iraq for suspending cooperation with 
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UNSCOM, for expelling the UNSCOM team from Iraq, and to degrade a WMD 
capability that Iraq was allegedly concealing. The latter claim has been repeated 
frequently, including by Colin Powell during his infamous 2003 presentation at the 
UN.356 However, this allegation was false. Although Iraq had ceased cooperation, it did 
not expel UNSCOM. Instead, according to second UNSCOM director Richard Butler, it 
was he that withdrew UNSCOM, on US advice: “I received a telephone call from US 
Ambassador Peter Burleigh inviting me for a private conversation at the US mission... 
Burleigh informed me that on instructions from Washington it would be ‘prudent to take 
measures to ensure the safety and security of UNSCOM staff presently in Iraq.’ ... I told 
him that I would act on this advice and remove my staff from Iraq.”357 Furthermore, the 
claim that the airstrikes were aimed at degrading an alleged WMD capability is not 
substantiated by the targeting array. According to military affairs analyst William Arkin:  
Thirty-five of the 100 targets were selected because of their role in Iraq's 
air defense system, an essential first step in any air war, because damage to those 
sites paves the way for other forces and minimizes casualties all around. Only 13 
targets on the list are facilities associated with chemical and biological weapons 
or ballistic missiles, and three are southern Republican Guard bases that might be 
involved in a repeat invasion of Kuwait. 
 
The heart of the Desert Fox list (49 of the 100 targets) is the Iraqi regime 
itself: a half-dozen palace strongholds and their supporting cast of secret police, 
guard and transport organizations. Some sites, such as Radwaniyah, had been 
bombed in 1991 (Saddam's quarters there were designated "L01" in Desert Storm, 
meaning the first target in the Leadership category).358 
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 With UNSCOM out of the country, a growing international outcry to lift the 
sanctions, and the failure of the US to overthrow Iraq through a combination of sanctions 
and covert operations, the next logical step was war.  
 In this final phase of US-Iraq relations examined in this study, the US doubled 
down on a failed strategy. When US policy aims in Iraq could no longer be attained 
through more indirect means, it opted to do so through direct means. In its effort to exert 
more direct control over Iraq, the US only succeeded in losing control. Countless failed 
coups demonstrated that Saddam’s government was too deeply entrenched to be toppled 
by any action short of a foreign invasion. The victimization of the Iraqi people 
throughout the 1990s had the effect of further entrenching his rule and allowing him to 
present himself as the defender of a people unjustly targeted by a vindictive and 
genocidal superpower. Instead of coming to the conclusion that regime change would 
fail, efforts to continue regime change would only increase the suffering of the Iraqi 
people, and that the US would lose more control over Iraq, the US doubled down yet 
again by invading Iraq in 2003.  
 
Afterword: The Final Betrayal, and Iraq’s Enduring Suffering 
 Much has been written of the 2003 Iraq War, and the deceit which led the US into 
that war. It is well-known how the 9/11 attacks were exploited to set in motion a series of 
regime changes in the Middle East, a grand strategy devised by a neoconservative think 
tank known as the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), whose members came 
to occupy the George W. Bush administration. Likewise, much has been written of the 
consequences of this criminal war, from the staggering death toll, to the scourge of ISIL. 
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Therefore this is not the place to excessively debate the finer points of the Iraq War. 
Doing so could easily take up another couple hundred pages of analysis. However, it is 
important to briefly reflect on how over sixty years of short-sighted, cynical, and failed 
policies led up to this point.  
 The aim of this study was partly motivated by a desire to contextualize the Iraq 
War against the backdrop of a much deeper history between the US and Iraq. Keeping 
this in mind, the Iraq War was merely a later chapter in a long history of the US 
attempting to exert its influence in Iraq, albeit a more devastating and blatant example. 
Brief glimmers were given into that long and troubled history. During an interview with 
CNN, a startled Donald Rumsfeld was confronted with footage of his infamous meeting 
with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad in the 1980s. While brief glimmers into a deeper 
history emerged, they were largely glossed over, thus giving the impression that the Iraq 
War was a more recent development. Perhaps this was by design. In absence of a deeper 
historical context, the Iraq War incriminates the Bush administration alone. With that 
context, it incriminates generations of US policymakers, as well as the the US foreign 
policy establishment itself. It shows that those policymakers did not learn their lesson, 
and instead decided to take the same actions over and over again, expecting different 
results.  
 In examining the consequences of these policies, the study was also aimed at 
highlighting the humanitarian consequences. Simply put, the wanton disregard of human 
rights by the US has helped lead to a catastrophe for the Iraqi people. One of the more 
startling revelations of the Iraq War came from a 2006 mortality study published in The 
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Lancet, which found that by July 2006, 654,965 Iraqis had died as a result of the war.359 
In isolation, this figure is shocking. Taking into account the death and devastation 
wrought on by the Iran-Iraq War, Gulf War, UN sanctions regime, and all that followed 
after 2006, it reveals a humanitarian catastrophe decades in the making. Indeed, it is an 
enduring catastrophe. Most recently, after the defeat of ISIL in Iraq, the Iraqi government 
reported that reconstruction would cost up to $88 billion.360  
 What all this shows is that US policymakers have not learned the lessons of 
history, and they have not learned from the failures of their past policies, nor have they 
considered the consequences of their policies for the Iraqi people. For careful observers, 
many of the consequences were easily predictable. Keeping in mind the failure to bend 
Iraq to the will of the US through sanctions, to make Saddam Hussein into a loyal US 
client, the British failure to exert direct control after the 1920 revolt, and the failure to 
exert even indirect control after the fall of the Iraqi monarchy, it should have been 
evident that any further attempts to bend Iraq to the will of the west would end in 
disaster. In the short-term, they might succeed. In the long-term, it would ultimately fail. 
Throughout every step of the process, it came at a high human cost. Despite this, US 
policymakers adopted the same fundamental policy assumption and expected different 
results, with disastrous consequences for the Iraqi people, and for the region.  
 Why it is that US policy towards Iraq was so cynical and callous, and why the US 
continued pursuing disastrous and costly policies through the decades remain open to 
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question. Seldom do policymakers acknowledge the cynicism and blithe disregard for 
human rights, with exception to Kissinger and his infamous mantra that “covert action 
should not be confused with missionary work.” Without a doubt, access to oil superseded 
human rights. Without a doubt, the greed of corporations and desire of politicians to 
satisfy their corporate constituents was a major factor as well. To what extent racism 
played a role is unclear, and also not openly acknowledged or deeply explored. Clearly 
there was a prevailing view until the George W. Bush administration that democracy was 
not possible in Iraq, and that a heavy-handed dictator was needed to keep the society 
from descending into chaos. For a state to engage in policies which lead to massive 
suffering for another people, they often engage in thinking which portrays people in other 
countries as something less than human, thus creating a justification to engage in such 
callous behavior. Lastly, there remains the question as to how many of these policies 
were the product of ignorance or indifference, be it towards the Iraqi people, their culture 
and history, or towards US-Iraq relations. When the Nixon administration launched the 
“cynical enterprise” of arming the Kurds, issues ranging from Vietnam to Watergate and 
detente with the USSR sucked resources away which could otherwise have been used to 
devise a smarter and more humane Iraq policy. During the Reagan administration there 
was undoubtedly a great degree of indifference, one which led the US to see as nothing 
more than a bludgeon to use against Iran. Such questions are not exclusive to US-Iraq 
relations, and can be applied to the relations the US has with other countries. Indeed, the 
US-Iraq relation is not the only “cynical enterprise” of US foreign policy, and it will 
certainly not be the last if there is not a fundamental review of US foreign policy.  
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